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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear the
subject appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp.
1988).

This Brief Amicus Curiae is filed pursuant to the

provisions of Rule 25, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

Would adoption of Utah Power & Light Company's

(UP&L?s) interpretation of §10-2-424, Utah Code Ann., 1953 as
amended, and its theory as to the measure of damages foster
anti-competitive effects and further skew the competitive
imbalance between UP&L and municipal power systems.
2.

Was §10-2-424, Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended,

intended by the Utah State Legislature to be a condemnation
statute and does it require a theory of compensation applying
traditional eminent domain measures of damage?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

Utah Const. Art. XI, Section 5(b):
(Cities have power)

to furnish all local public

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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services, to purchase, hire, construct, own, maintain and
operate, or lease, public utilities local in extent and
use; to acquire by condemnation, or otherwise, necessary
for any such purposes, subject to restrictions imposed by
general law for protection of other communities; and to
grant local public utility franchises and within its powers
regulate the exercise thereof.
Utah Code Ann. Section 10-20-424:
Whenever the electric consumers of the area being
annexed are receiving electric utility services from
sources other than the annexing municipality, the
municipality may not, without the consent of the electric
utility, furnish its electric utility services to the
electric consumers until the municipality has reimbursed
the electric utility company which previously provided the
services for the fair market value of those facilities
dedicated to provide service to the annexed area. If the
annexing municipality and the electric utility cannot agree
on the fair market value, it shall be determined by the
state court having jurisdiction.
Utah Code Ann. Section 10-7-4:
The board of commissioners, city council or board of
trustees of any city or town may acquire, purchase or lease
all or any part of any water, waterworks system, water
supply or property connected therewith, and whenever the
governing body of a city or town shall deem it necessary
for the public good such city or town may being
condemnation proceedings to acquire the same; provided,
that if within thirty days after the passage and
publication of a resolution or ordinance for the purchase
or lease or condemnation herein provided for one-third or
the resident taxpayers of the city or town, as shown by the
assessment roll, shall protest against the purchase, lease
or condemnation proceedings contemplated, such proposed
purchase, lease or condemnation shall be referred to a
special election, and if confirmed by a majority vote
thereat, shall take effect; otherwise it shall be void. In
all condemnation proceedings the value of land affected by
the taking must be considered in connection with the water
or water rights taken for the purpose of supplying the city
or town or the inhabitants thereof with water.
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-34-1:
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Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the right
of eminent domain may be exercised in behalf of the
following public uses:
(i)
(2)
(3) public buildings and grounds for the use of any
county, city or incorporated town, or board of education;
reservoirs, canals, aqueducts, flumes, ditches, or pipes
for conducting water for the use of the inhabitants of any
county or city or incorporated town, or for the draining of
any county, city or incorporated town; the raising of the
banks of streams, removing obstructions therefrom, and
widening, deepening or straightening their channels; roads,
streets and alleys; and all other public uses for the
benefit of any county, city or incorporated town, or the
inhabitants thereof.
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8) telegraph, telephone, electric light and electric
power lines, and sites for electric light and power plants.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1 Nature of the case, course of the proceeding and
the disposition below.
On April 17, 1989, Utah Associated Municipal Power
Systems (UAMPS) petitioned this Court for Leave to File an
Amicus Curiae Brief.

The Motion was predicated upon the fact

that this Court should be apprised of the concerns expressed by
the Federal Energy Regulator respecting certain
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anti-competitive practices by UP&L and the effect that a
decision by this Court adopting UP&Lfs theory of damages would
have on the ability of municipal power agencies to compete with
UP&L respecting the servicing of newly annexed residents with
electrical utility services.

Additionally, the Motion also

sought to address some of the issues respecting the measure of
damages which were not addressed in the Logan City Brief.
On April 18, 1989 this Court granted UAMPS* Motion and
the time for filing of the Amicus Brief was subsequently
enlarged to and including May 25, 1989.
UAMPS adopts the statement of the case as set forth in
the Brief of Logan City but recognizes the fact that UP&L
disputes Logan's view that ownership of UP&L distribution
facilities are not a central issue in the case.

UAMPS takes no

position with respect to which is the correct interpretation.
2

Statement of Facts

UAMPS adopts Logans statement of facts as set forth in
its brief.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1.

For this Court to adopt UP&LTs interpretations of

§10-2-424, Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended, (hereinafter §424)
and its theories of the measure of damages, would be
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anti-competitive and, frustrate or foreclose the ability of
municipalities to serve annexed residents.
2.

Section 424 was never intended by the Utah State

Legislature as a condemnation statute.

It was only intended to

fairly compensate a utility previously servicing annexed areas
for its "dedicated facilities" which were providing service to
the annexed areas.

UP&L's theory of damages either as to its

measure of market value or in the nature of condemnation are
contrary to legislative intent and not required by §424.

ARGUMENT

I.

TO ADOPT UTAH POWER & LIGHT'S INTERPRETATION OF
§ 10-2-424 AND ITS THEORY OF THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES
WOULD BE ANTI-COMPETITIVE AND WOULD FRUSTRATE OR
FORECLOSE THE ABILITY OF MUNICIPALITIES TO SERVE
ANNEXED RESIDENTS.

UAMPS' members include Beaver, Blanding, Bountiful,
Brigham City, Enterprise, Ephraim, Fairview, Fillmore, Beaver
Light & Power, Holden, Hurricane, Hyrum, Kanosh, Kaysville,
Lehi, Meadow, Monroe, Morgan, Mt. Pleasant, Murray, Oak City,
Parowan, Payson, Price, Santa Clara, St. George, Spring City,
Springville, Strawberry Electric Service District, and
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Washington.

UAMPS1 members have cooperatively organized in

order to secure reliable, economic sources of electric power
for their residents.
As may be expected, the relationship between UP&L and
the public power agencies in Utah, including the members of
UAMPS

has not always been salubrious.

UAMPS1 members firmly

believe that local control and accountability assures better
and more economic service.

There is also considerable pride in

the autonomy represented by municipally owned and operated
utilities.
Municipal power systems serve an important function by
providing "yardstick" competition with investor-owned
utilities.

Although the Utah Public Service Commission is

intended to be a substitute for free market competition, there
is still the need for benchmarks against which the
reasonableness of investor owned utility rates may be measured.
The residents of areas annexed by municipalities which
own and operate their own electric distribution systems should
have the right to consider, among other things, the advantages
available of service from the municipal utilities.

The

position advanced by UP&L in this case would tend to restrict
or eliminate the choices the citizens may have by making it
much more difficult for the annexing municipality to provide
those services.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
-7Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The competitive
L i i i e a awa;

r

a r e n a in U t a h h a s h i s t o r i c a l l y

*" . * ., - : - : p : :

r o w : ' " 'stt:m.

investor-owi.eu v. ;aL;L-.:

- .1;. ^ x a m p . e , : i:c .iu.mc ; ; -a 1 .•,> stems

ire t r a n s m i s s i o n d e p e n d e n t
1

' ' Lransr

J . ~

:; :in 1 c i p a l : tv :t

been

m e a n i n g that ti.ev i't; v e x c l u s i v e l y
*-* *

•>

cquire, construct

r operate

*

its nu- e'.ectric
:hi se

right

vvxL..i,. ' ;:t.- .nana ^ 4 M I i 11111;
e x a m p l e of

No; v U t h i L c i i i u i n ^

t h e cliff*

; upaidi" support

e l e c t r 1 - system.

Cedar r i t v ' s

v::n:,

.nuts.

,t

been able

.^

t r- c o n v e r t

-a 1 • v 'Mat

:J:

n-lv

In f a c t .

.^I.K :pdi
realistic

\- r>
+

thei^* s y s t e m s

1

a ninnicip^iiM

operation

; ; the

alternative

tew m u n i c i p a l i t i e s

ror

faces

is

the

have

' n i , e s t or - -WTV^" *

. .

s u c c e s s ruii>

con^ummai ea s-*ch a t r a n s i t i o n a r e K a n a b , Santa

C l a r a , and W a s h i n g t o n .
; • .: e

away from publi

power

in -'tali h a s reeii the l o n g - s t a n d i n g

pr-iiciP^ and rri'' f :c & s of "FVI r^spectinp

,

'c

relationships
c appro v a ]

or

; iu

nerger

or CP^L ana r a c i n t o r i

t

t :ie F e d e r a l

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Energy

Regulatory Commission ("FERC") made a number of findings with
regard to the historical anti-competitive behavior of UP&L.
Utah Power & Light Company, PacifiCorp, PC/UP&L Merging
Corporation, Opinion No. 318, 45 FERC II 61095 (Oct. 26, 1988),
modified, Opinion No. 318-A 47 FERC U 61 (May 12, 1989)
(hereinafter "Opinion No. 318").

A copy of the FERC opinion is

attached hereto as Appendix A.
In Opinion No. 318, the FERC affirmed the findings of
the FERC Administrative Law Judge with regard to UP&Lfs
anti-competitive behavior both before and after the merger.
The FERC expressly found that the proposed merger "would likely
substantially lessen competition and tend to create a
monopoly."

(Opinion No. 318 at p. 14.)

One of the findings

made by the FERC was that UP&L had "consistently refused to
permit the wheeling of low-cost power across its system in
order to use its strategically located bottleneck to extract
monopoly prices."

(Opinion No. 318 at p. 33.)

The FERC imposed certain conditions which, if
satisfied by the merged company, would ameliorate such
anti-competitive behavior.

These conditions include certain

obligations to provide wheeling to transmission-dependent
utilities such as the members of UAMPS.
The relevance of the FERC Opinion in this proceeding
is simply to indicate that UP&L has historically occupied a
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less expensive and can guarantee local control as to rates and
service.

The right to be served, and reciprocally the right to

serve, should not be abrogated nor impeded by artificially high
damage theories.
If the practical effect of adopting UP&I/s damage
measure is to foreclose the ability of an annexed resident to
be served by an annexing municipality, or conversely, to make
it financially impossible for the annexing municipality to
serve its new residents, then not only may it offend the
constitution of Utah but would foster the anti-competitive
effects identified by the FERC.
In the case before the Court Logan has offered
$117,000 to compensate UP&L for the value of its local
facilities.

UP&L counters, arguing that the measure of damages

equates to $434,987 dollars ($343,568 according to the
alternative condemnation evaluation).

The territory annexed to

Logan included fifty five customers who generated a total of
$77,000 gross billings per year.
Logan argues that adopting UP&L's measure of damages
would amount to a practical foreclosure of its constitutional
right to service its customers pursuant to Article XI, §5(b)
Utah Constitution.

UAMPS would submit that even adopting

UP&L's alternate and less expensive damage measure may have the
same effect.

Testimony in the District Court established that
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Additionally, this case arises at a time when the
recent merger will provide huge economic advantages to UP&L .
Notwithstanding the terms and conditions imposed by the FERC,
municipal utilities and other public power agencies will be
hard-pressed to remain

competitive in such a climate all to

the advantage of UP&L.
UAMPS urges this Court to be mindful of the far
reaching effect that an excessive measure of damage will have
not just to Logan City but to the public power systems in
Utah.

Such a ruling would

frustrate the vitality so necessary

for public power systems to continue to serve their customers
reliably and economically.
Logan has made a reasonable offer to compensate UP&L
for its facilities which have heretofore serviced the annexed
territory.
position.

The District Court agreed and rejected the UP&L
Its position to compensate only the dedicated local

facilities and a pro rata amount for partially dedicated
facilities is consistant with legislative intent and is fair in
all respects.

Logan's position with respect to the measure of

damages is not only reasonable but allows the city to service
and the customers to be serviced and enhances market place
competition.
II.

§10-2-424, UTAH CODE ANN., 1953 AS AMENDED, IS

NOT, NOR WAS IT EVER INTENDED, AS A CONDEMNATION STATUTE NOR
DOES IT REQUIRE COMPENSATION APPLYING TRADITIONAL EMINENT
DOMAIN THEORY.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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condemn an existing and operating power system by eminent
domain.

CP National Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 638

P.2d 519 (Utah 1981)
In discussing sections of the Utah Code which confer
the right of condemnation and define the powers of
municipalities this Court concluded that:
"No. . . express statutory authority exists for
municipalities to condemn a power system.ff at 523
Furthermore, the Court construed the relevant portions
of §78-34-1 Utah Code Ann., 1953 as authorizing the
condemnation of real property not already constructed
facilities.

In so concluding the Court held:

"The taking of an ongoing public utility business
is more than the taking of real or even tangible
personal properties and is therefore. . . not
contemplated within the meaning of §78-34-1(3)."
at 523
The Court also limited the provisions of §78-34-1(8)
Utah Code Ann., 1953, which authorize the condemnation of
"electric light and electric power lines and sites for electric
light and power plants," to the lines and sites for a power
plant.
Having thus concluded that the exercise of eminent
domain was not available to municipalities to authorize the
condemnation of operating electric power systems, the Court
finalized its conclusions with a statement important to the
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and Logan in their respective Briefs is indicative of
legislative intent.

In the 1985 Senate debates on the

amendments to §424 an interesting dialogue is engaged in by the
sponsor. Senator Sowards and Senators Bangerter, Matheson,
Hillyard, Barton and Bunnell.

A portion of that dialogue was

referenced in Logan's Brief but reproduced herein for total
context:
Senator Matheson:
Then Senator, then suppose now that whoever the
utility you're going to purchase from don't want
to sell. Now this bill gives you the right to
negotiate with them for an arms-length sal^, I
suppose. But does it give you the right of
condemn, er, of eminent domain. It ought to just
automatically take that over without a court
proceeding if they won't negotiate in good faith.
Senator Bangerter:
I think on the eminent domain system, I had
better get some help. What about some eminent
domain, counselor?
Senator Hillyard:
I expect that they probably could file an eminent
domain for a public right. I would have to look
up that specific question, but, cities, number
one, do have the power of eminent domain, but its
only for what they do, the purpose, right, uh,
their public right. But if they do, then they
pay what the court or the jury determines to be a
fair market value. And I don't think there is
any different way of negotiating what an
arbitrator would decide.
Senator Matheson:
That's correct. But under this bill, now suppose
they don't want to negotiate like you've said
here for fair market value and they don't want to
sell. Now are you going to let them, under this
bill, require that you give it to them? Is that
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:,! • -or approach to eminent domain, is
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:

he

" ' • isking?

Senator Hillyard:
Well, I don't think its a back door approach, I
think that the city has the power of eminent
domain. How they exercise it is the question
Senator Mathesom
Not without going to court
Senator Hj^lJLvard:
Thatf s right".
Senator Matheson;
Are you granting that powei to them i low to take
this without going to court ui ider the process of
e m i II e n t domain?
Senator Hillyard:
No No
Senator Matheson:
If they don't want to s• B] 1 \
Unidentified:
I think you wouiu uc- u ^ k 11 11o coui t i f ;;; \ : > \ • :ai : f 1:
agree to a figure on eminent domain.
Senator BangerLCI .
Mr. President. I think, this bi i , , tih, in answer
to Senator Matheson, I think that citizens as
they annex, they have the constitutional right to
have the same kind of services because they pay
the same kind of taxes. And whether in the court
process that that has to happen through eminent
domain, I think that, my opinion, would be that
that woti 1 d be up t o the c ourt s .
President:
Senator Barton.
Senator Barton:
I think on page 2, line 6, the question is
stated. While starting on line 5, it says
the annexing municipality and the electric
utility cannot agree on the fair market
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reimbursement value, it shall be determined by
the state court having jurisdiction." So that
doesn't even speak to eminent domain, uh, the
court will decide.
Senator Bangerter:
That's correct. That's the way I understand it,
too.
Senator Bunnell:
I think that what this says is if you annex and
you're getting power from UP&L, they have a right
to serve you until the city reimburses you for
the fair value, 1 mean reimburses the utility.
Now, if you can't agree on the fair value, then
they have to go to court, but if the city offers
them like $50,000.00, if that's the fair value,
they have to take it. They would have to prove
it in court if they couldn't agree. So the
penalty is that these people will stay on UP&L
until the deal is made. On the other side, it
forces the utility and the municipality to make a
deal. If they don't, they have to go to court.
Senator Bangerter:
I think that's correct.
While there appears to be some confusion as to the
means of compensation. Senator Barton nicely summerizes the
purpose and intent of the bill.
Logan is absolutely correct in its assertion that §424
was enacted in part to encourage "good faith negotiation."
Senator Sowards, in his final statement before the vote to
reconsider action of the bill in 1983 stated in response to a
similar observation from Senator Bangerter:
"That's
why were passing
from litigation."

the

bill^

to get away

There is never a hint that the legislative scheme was
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intended to generate the "trappings" of a full blown
condemnation proceeding.

It was simply a good faith attempt to

find a fair method of balancing the right of annexing
municipalities to serve their new residents and to "fairly, not
extravagantly," reimburse the previously servicing utility.

It

is an attempt, admittedly not a perfect one, to encourage
settlement and to avoid the acrimony that almost always attends
condemnation litigation.
UAMPS concedes that UP&L is entitled to compensation
for its "facilities dedicated to provide service to annexed
areas."

The basis for the measure of damage, however, is

defined by the language of the bill itself.

Again the

legislative hearings are an indication of what was intended.
Senator Sowards, the original sponsor of the 1983 version of
§424, explained that the purpose of the bill "is to provide
that electric utilities are fairly paid for their facilities
and equipment in areas that they are servicing when they are
annexed by a municipality with a power system of its own."
Additionally, it is obvious from a reading of the
legislative hearings and particularly of Senator Sowards'
testimony, that he was sponsoring House Bill 354 (the eventual
§424) in the Senate on behalf of UP&L and was being advised by
counsel for UP&L.

It must thus be assumed that the sponsor,

with the concurrence of the bills major proponent, were
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comfortable with the language of their legislative initiative.
Although §424 was further amended to remove
restrictions relative to existing franchise rights, there is no
suggestion in any of the hearings or the later amendments that
compensation was to be paid for anything other than "facilities
and equipment."

UP&L now argues that §424 requires

compensation for "severance damage, going concern value and the
value of its franchise rights."

It cites for authority

numerous cases which it asserts support its position respecting
damages.

Although, these cases involve municipal annexation,

each case involves the application of specific condemnation
statutes setting forth the method by which the city attempted
to take over the property of a private utility.

Relying upon

such case authority, UP&L argues that the only logical and
constitutional interpretation of §424 is that it requires
compensation for not only its local facilities, but a share of
UP&L system assets, including generation, substations,
franchising and going concern values.

It presents a neat,

seemingly definitive percentage calculation as to the portion
of its system "dedicated" to the servicing of the fifty five
annexed residents and calculates the fair market of all such
damage.
Although not conceding that this matter involves
condemnation, prominent commentators have discussed the
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difficulty in determining "standards of compensation in utility
condemnation."

Quoting case law it has been said:

"The standard of compensation in utility
condemnation is an extremely vague one, and
although many tests are considered none seems to
be controlling. No rigid measure can be
prescribed for the determination of "just
compensation under all circumstances and in all
cases." No hard fast rule can be laid down that
will cover every case nor fix in advance the
limit of the matters that may be taken into
consideration in any particular case. Various
tests have been employed, alone and in
combination. The usual method of fixing the
value of property for taking is by ascertaining
market value. There is hardly a market, in the
usual sense, for a public utility, particularly
the regulated utility. We must, therefore, turn
to other tests of value. What we use is largely
a matter of judgment and circumstance,
(emphasis added) 4A Nichols, The Law of Eminent
Domain, §15.4(1), citing, Onondaga County Water
Authority v. New York Water Service Corp. 285
App. Div. 655, 139 N.Y.S. 2d 255
UAMPS submits that this is precisely the test that
should be applied herein and in the future when §424 becomes
applicable.

Because of the unique circumstances that exist in

Utah respecting the economic and competitive advantages
historically enjoyed by UP&L and now even more evidenced by the
recent merger, this Court should judge this appeal in view of
those realities.
The District Court in this case has made an award
which fairly compensates UP&L for its "dedicated and partially
dedicated transmission facilities.

UP&L no longer will have
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the beneficial use of these facilities (whether it retains
title or not) and it should be compensated.
The valuation of these facilities is reasonably
susceptible to objective determination.

It is difficult to

understand, however, how the loss of fifty-five residential
customers will have an adverse economic impact on UP&L/s
system, particularly where many times that number of customers
are added to the system each week.

With the huge economic and

competitive advantages enjoyed by UP&L it should not be granted
''windfall damages'1 at the expense of the few small
municipalities who seek only to service newly acquired
residents desiring the municipal utility services.

CONCLUSION

UAMPS joins with Logan City in submitting that the
judgment of the District Court be affirmed.
UAMPS has suggested herein that the over-riding public
policy concerns expressed by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission should be given great deference by this Court in
reviewing this matter on appeal.

UP&L has advanced a theory of

damages which if granted will substantially interfere with the
rights of municipalities to service its annexed customers with
electric utility services.

Furthermore, while the legislature
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was certainly concerned about fairness in reimbursement of a
utility

which had previously serviced an annexed territory,

it was also concerned about fairness to the municipality with
the hope that when such annexations occur, reimbursement could
be facilitated through a reasonable negotiation process.

The

Legislature could never have intended a result which would so
substantially enhance the already competitive market advantage
enjoyed by UP&L.
It is therefore respectively submitted that the award
of reimbursement to UP&L by the District Court was reasonable
and that the same should be affirmed by this Court.
DATED this 25the day of May, 1989.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

e

1

JLL.

Johi^ T. Nielsei
irneys for Amicus Curiae
outh Main Street, Suite 1600
. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
-24Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE UTAH ASSOCIATED
MUNICIPAL POWER SYSTEMS to be mailed, postage prepaid, this
25the day of May, 1989, to the following:
Samuel F. Chamberlain, A0611
UTAH POWER & LIGHT CO.
1407 West North Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

W. Scott Barrett, A0228
CITY OF LOGAN
255 North Main Street
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (801) 752-3060

W. Cullen Battle, A0246
Douglas J. Payne, A4113
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
A Professional Corporation
215 South State Street
P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151
Telephone: (801) 531-8900

Attorney for Plaintiff
and Respondent

Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellant

4499N
052589

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
-25Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

APPENDIX

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
2 6contain
Machine-generated OCR, -may
errors.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

pn

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION WQCf ?C .,

tHfl:SQ

OPINION NCI
Utah Power 4. Light company
PacifiCorp
PC/UP&L Merging Corporation

)
)
)

Docket No. EC88-2-000

OPINION AND ORDER AFFIRMING IN PART, MODIFYING IN
AND REVERSING IN PART INITIAL DECISION AND
CONDITIONALLY APPROVING MERGER

PROPERTY OF PilBljp REFERENCE

DO NOT m m fROM
ROOM 1000

Issued:

»ctober

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

r,

UNITED STATES Of AMERICA
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
Utah Power & Light Company
PacifiCorp
PC/UP&L Merging Corporation

)
)
)

Docket No, ECS8-2-000

OPINION NO.
APPEARANCES
Arnold H« Quint, Richard W, Goldman, Evans B, Brasfield and
Daniel A. Carrell for Utah Power & Light Company, Pacificorp
and PC/UP&L Merging Corporation
Henlen J, Edwards and Sidney G. Baucom for Utah IF ower & Light
Company
George M. Galloway for PacifiCorp and PC ' UP&L Mer ging Corporation
J . Patrick Berry and Charles M, Darling IV, for AMAX Magnesium
Corporation
Jeffrey T. Sprung and Joseph C. Bell for Citizens Energy
Corporation
Donald R. Allen, John P. Williams, Leslie P. Kent and Gary A.
Dodge for Colorado River Energy Distributors Association
Lvnn W. Mitton for Deseret Generation & Transmission Corporation
Jade Alice Eaton, David B. Raskin and J.A, Bouknioht, Jr., for
Idaho Power Company and Montana Power Company
P.L. Jaurequi for Idaho Power Company
Daniel 0, Flanagan for Montana Power Company
J. Cathy Fooel for Mid-West Electric Consumers Association
Peter J.P« Brickfield, Jill M. Barker -rn j Daniel C. Kaufman
Nucor Steel
Judith H. Bearzi, Truman P. Price ar id R. Michael Austin for
Public Power Council
Channing p. Strother, Jr., and Joshua L. Menter for Sierra
Pacific Power Company

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

fa

Docket Ho

FX88-2-000

-2-

Richarci M, bharp. Randolph Lee Elliott and Timothy K. Shuba for
Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems and Washington City,
Utah
Scott Hemplina fui United Mine Workers of America, Environmental
Action, Salt Lake Citizens Congress, and Salt LaI.e Area
Community Action Program
Michael Ginsberg for Utah Division of Public Utilities
Willam B. Bofrling. Donald B. Holbrook. Calvin L. Rampton,
Elizabeth M. Haslam and David B. Lee for Utility
Shareholders Association of Utah
Robert E. Neate for The Washington Water Power Company
Daniel J, Wright for Arizona public Service Company
Richard L. Hincklev for Nevada Power Company
Don Garber for San Diego Gas & Electric Company
Robert c. McDiarmid and Daniel 1, Davidson the for National Rural
Electric Cooperative Association, American Public Power
Association, Mid-West Electrid Consumers Association, Inc.
Great Lakes Electric Consumers Association, Northwest Public
Power Association, Southwestern Power Resources Association,
Southeastern Power Resources Committee and Idaho Cooperative
Utilities Association
Michael D. Oldak for the National Rural Electric Cooperative
Association
C. Stephen Angle. Joseph H. Long and Thomas J, Conley for the
Staff of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
Before Commissioners:

Martha 0, Hesse, Chairman;
Charles G. Stalon and Charles A. Trabandt.

Utah Power & Light Company
)
PacifiCorp
)
Docket No. EC88-2-000
PC/UP&L Mergi r ic:j Corporation )
OPINION NO. 318
OPINION AND ORDER AFFIRMING IN PART, MODIFYING IN PART,
AND REVERSING IN PART INITIAL DECISION AND
CONDITIONALLY APPROVING MERGER
(Issued October 26, 1988)
I.

Background

On October 5, 1987, Utah Power & Light (UP&L), PacifiCorp
(PacifiCorp Maine) and PC/UP&L Merging Corporation (PacifiCorp
Oregon) (collectively referred to as Applicants) filed a joint
application under section 203 of the Federal Power Act (FPA) 1/
seeking approval of a proposed merger.
Pursuant to an agreement and plan of
merger (merger agreement), the Applicants
PacifiCorp Maine and UP&L into PacifiCorp
PacifiCorp upon completion of the merger)
to be the surviving corporation. 2 '
A.

reorganization and
propose to merge
Oregon (to be renamed
with PacifiCorp Oregon

The Parties to the Proposed Merger
1.

Utah Power & Light Company

UP&L is engaged principally in the business of generating
and selling electric energy in Utah, southeastern Idaho and
southwestern Wyoming. UPiL's electric service area of
approximately 90,000 square miles contains approximately 510,000
retail customers. UP&L serves Salt Lake City, West Valley, and
Ogden, Utah and over 400 other cities and towns at retail and
serves numerous municipalities and electric associations at
1/

16 U.S.C. § 824b (1982).

2/

The merger agreement provides that the capital stock of
UP&L and PacifiCorp Maine shall be converted into
shares of the capital stock of PacifiCorp Oregon.
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wholesale. The company also sells surplus power and energy to
other utilities. The Applicants state that PacifiCorp Oregon
will conduct the same general business when the transaction is
consummated., under the assumed business name of Utah Power &
Light Company.
UP&L's transmission system is comprised of 7,788 miles of
transmission lines. The company utilizes its facilities
generally to supply electric services within its service area and
to sell electric energy at wholesale pursuant to contracts and
rate schedules on file with the Commission. The company also
uses its transmission lines to transmit electric energy in
interstate commerce.
UP&L is interconnected by high-voltage transmission lines to
IB adjacent major power systems. UP&L is a member of the
Northwest Power Pool and is a party to the Intercompany Pool
Agreement with seven Northwest utilities. UP&L is also connected
to other power pools within the region of the Western Systems
Coordinating Council.
2.

PacifiCorp Maine

PacifiCorp Maine ic a diversified corporation doing business
as Pacific Power & Light Company (PP&L). PP&L is engaged in
generating and selling electric energy in California, Idaho,
Montana, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming. PP&L's electric
service area of approximately 63,000 square miles contains
approximately 670,000 retail customers. PP&L serves over 240
cities and towns at retail and wholesale. The company sells
surplus power and energy to other utilities. The Applicants
state that PacifiCorp Oregon will conduct the same general
business when the transaction is consummated, under the assumed
business name of Pacific Power & Light Company.
PP&L owns and operates approximately 20,600 miles of
transmission lines and is interconnected with the systems of
other utilities in California, Montana, Oregon, Washington, and
Wyoming. PP&L is also a member of the Northwest Power Pool and
is a party to the Intercompany Pool Agreement with seven
Northwest utilities. It is interconnected with UP&L at UP&Lfs
Naughton Plant near Kemmerer, Wyoming. PP&L sells electric
energy at wholesale in interstate commerce and transmits electric
energy in interstate commerce.
PacifiCorp Oregon
PacifiCorp Oregon was incorporated for the purpose of
effectuating the proposed merger. Upon approval of the merger,
PacifiCorp Oregon would provide electric service to more than
1,180,000 retail customers throughout California, Idaho, Mont2-
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Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Its electric service
territory would aggregate approximately 153,000 square miles.
B.

The Applicants Statement with Regard to the Public
Interest

The Applicants state that the proposed merger will promote
the public interest and benefit customers of UP&L and PP&L by
integrating the electric utility properties now separately owned
and operated. 3/ They argue that because PP&L is a winterpeaking utility and UP&L is a summer-peaking utility, the
consolidation will provide opportunities for more efficient use
of power resources. This, they assert, will enhance the
reliability of service and postpone the need for costly addition
of resources and will enhance prospects of wholesale power sales
to the southwestern United States. 4/
The Applicants anticipate that the consolidation of
resources and operations and the economies of scale derived from
the merger will allow the elimination of overlapping functions
and result in future operating savings. Future operating savings
are also expected through the consolidation of inventories,
increased flexibility in scheduling maintenance of generation
plants, and shared services between the operation divisions. 5/
The Applicants further assert that the merger would present
an opportunity for increased operation efficiencies by virtue of
existing generating capacity, technical expertise and other
resources. PP&L currently obtains approximately 30 percent of
its power from hydroelectric generation and the remainder through
coal-fired generation. UP&L currently generates 92 percent of
its electricity at coal-fired plants and owns several coal
properties. The Applicants expect that the availability of
PP&L's surplus power may also enable the UP&L division to delay
construction of a new power plant, thereby deferring, and
possibly eliminating, costly construction expenditures. The
Applicants also expect that the benefits to be obtained will help
to stabilize rates and result in the development of a less
expensive and more efficient electrical system. 6/
Finally, the Applicants state that PacifiCorp Oregon, as the
surviving corporation, will ba both larger and financially
2/

Joint Application for Authorization for a Merger, filed
October 5, 1987 at 10-12-
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stronger than either company operating separately. Accordingly,
the Applicants assert that the merged company will be in a
stronger position to finance the acquisition or construction of
facilities on more advantageous terms. 2/
C

State Proceedings

Proceedings have been conducted by the state commissions in
Arizona, California, Montana, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and
Wyoming. Each of these state commissions has granted approval of
the proposed merger.
D.

The Cpmmjssjpn's Hearing Qrder

On December 12, 1987, the Commission set for expedited
hearing various issues with regard to the proposed merger. 8/

2/

Id-

8/

Utah Power & Light Co., fit 2l*, 41 FERC 1 61,283
(1987). The following parties sought and were granted
intervention in this proceeding: AMAX Magnesium
Corporation (AMAX); Citizens Energy Corporation;
Colorado River Energy Distributers Association (CREDA);
Deseret Generation & Transmission Corporation (Deseret
G&T); Idaho Power Company and Montana Power Company;
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association,
American Public Power Association, Mid-West Electric
Consumers Association, Inc., Great Lakes Electric
Consumers Association, Northwest Public Power
Association, Southwestern Power Resources Association,
Southeastern Power Resources Committee, and Idaho
Cooperative Utilities Association (collectively
referred to as NRECA/APPA, g£ al.); the Nucor Steel
Division of Nucor Corporation (Nucor Steel); Public
Power Council; Sierra Pacific Power Company (Sierra
Pacific); Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems
(UAMPS) and Washington City, Utah; United Mine Workers
of America, International Union, Environmental Action,
Salt Lake Citizens Congress and Salt Lake Area
Community Program (collectively referred to as United
Mine Workers, g£ a l O ' Utah Division of Public
Utilities; Utility Shareholders Association of Utah
(Shareholder Association); The Washington Water Power
Company; Arizona Public Service Company; Nevada Power
Company; San Diego Gas & Electric Company; Pacific Gas
and Electric Company; Southern California Edison
Company; South Dakota Public Utilities Commission;
Montana Public Service Commission; the Public Service
Commission of the State of Wyoming; Rogue Valley Fair
(continued-..)
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These issues include the effect of the proposed merger on rates,
the effect of the merger on the competitive situation, and the
effect of the merger on the ability of this Commission and the
various state commissions to regulate the merged entity.
We also set for hearing the issue of whether the merged
companies will be capable of being operated economically and
efficiently as a single entity, as well as the impact on the
public interest of the merged entity not operating as a single
entity to the extent such is found to be the case. 9/
E.

The Judge's Initial Decision

On June 13, 1988, the presiding administrative law judge
issued an Initial Decision finding that the Applicants have
failed to show that the proposed merger is consistent with the
public interest. 10/ The judge found that: (1) the Applicants
have not demonstrated that the benefits of the merger would
outweigh its costs; 11/ (2) the proposed merger would tend to
substantially lessen competition and create a monopoly; 12/ and
(3) the Applicants1 proposed structure, ratemaking, and
allocation methodologies would adversely affect the ability of
this Commission and the state commissions to regulate the merged
entity. 12/

£/(.•.continued)
Share; and the Public Utilities Commission of the State
of California. On February 19, 1988, Pacific Gas and
Electric Company filed a notice of withdrawal pursuant
to Rule 216 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and
Procedure, 18 C.F.R. § 385.216 (1988). Similarly, on
February 22, 1988, Southern California Edison Company
filed a notice of withdrawal.
9/

41 FERC at 61,75?.

10/

Utah Power & Light Co., et al., 43 FERC J 63,030
(1988) .

11/

Id. at 65,335.

12/

Id. at 65,359.

13/

Id. In addition to the findings of fact set forth in
the text of the Initial Decision, the judge set forth
ninety-one (91) "Further Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law." 43 FERC.at 65,354-59. Unless
specifically referred to in this opinion, no inference
should be drawn that we either affirm or reverse such find.
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The judge also found that the various conditions proposed by
the parties would not render the merger consistent with the
public interest. 14/ Moreover, he found that the Commission
lacks the authority to impose such conditions. Thus, the judge
found that the application for approval of the merger should be
denied.
F.

Briefs on Exception to the Judge's Initial Decision

On June 27, 1988, Briefs on Exception to the judge's Initial
Decision were filed by the following parties: the Applicants;
trial staff; Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems; Sierra
Pacific and Nevada Power Company; Washington Water Power Company;
Nucor Steel; AMAX; the Public Service Commission of Wyoming; the
Utah Division of Public Utilities; the Shareholder Association;
and CREDA. 15/
In their Brief on Exceptions, the Applicants state that they
except to almost every conclusion contained in the discussion
section of the Initial Decision, as well as to almost every
finding contained in the section of the Initial Decision entitled
Further Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 16/ They argue
that the judge erred in the Initial Decision in applying an
incorrect standard in determining whether the proposed merger is
consistent with the public interest; in concluding that the
merger is likely to lessen competition in any relevant market; in
dismissing the Applicants' proposed wheeling policy without
appropriate consideration; in concluding that the costs of the
merger outweigh its benefits; and in rejecting benefits on the
grounds that they are achievable by contract. 17/
The Applicants further contend that the judge erred in
requiring that a method for allocating costs between the
divisions be established prior to the merger; in determining that
the impact of the merger on customers' rates cannot be
determined; in finding that the merger may have a significant
impact on interruptible rates; in concluding that the impact on
the Bonneville Power Administration's rates cannot be determined
14/

Id. at 65,354.

15/

CREDA's Brief on Exceptions sets forth what it terms
"minor factual corrections" to the Initial Decision.
CREDA's Brief on Exceptions at 1. In lieu of a Brief
on Exceptions, the Public Power Counsel and the
Northwest Public Power Association filed a joint
statement of counsel raising no substantive issues.

16/

Applicants Brief on Exceptions at 7.

17/

i£. at 7-8.
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and that rates of other utilities may be adversely affected; in
holding that operation as a single coordinated entity is
constrained; in holding that shareholders should not share in the
benefits of the merger; in finding that PacifiCorp Maine's
diversified operations will have a significant impact on
investors1 risk perceptions of the merged company; and in
determining that the merger will impair effective regulation of
the merged company. 18/
Trial staff argues that the judge erred in finding that the
costs of the merger would not be offset by the benefits of the
merger; in interpreting the Commission order setting this matter
for hearing as requiring cost of service data from the
Applicants; in finding that the Applicants' rate proposals should
have been more definitive than they were; in not considering
trial staff's proposal for correcting the rate problems; in
finding that it would not be possible to effectively regulate the
merged company; in finding that trial staff and intervenors were
denied a reasonable opportunity to comment on the Applicants1
proposed wheeling policy; in concluding that the Commission lacks
authority to impose wheeling conditions in approving a merger;
and in failing to consider trial staff's proposed wheeling
policy. 12/
Trial staff also argues that the Initial Decision
incorrectly decides several issues that are significant to the
future exercise of the Commission's authority. Specifically,
trial staff argues that the Initial Decision: (1) sets forth an
incorrect standard for determining whether the benefits of a
merger exceed its cost; (2) applies an overly stringent standard
for demonstrating future rate impact; (3) incorrectly finds an
absence of authority to impose conditions necessary to remedy
defects in a merger application; and (4) erroneously rejects
effective proposals that would successfully address the
development of appropriate future rates and certain adverse
effects on competition that would otherwise be produced by the
merger. 20/
Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems excepts to the
Initial Decision to the extent that it finds that the
Commission's authority to condition its approval of mergers under
section 203 of FPA does not include the authority to require
conditions relating to wheeling access or to require any other
condition that is not strictly related to: (1) maintaining
adequate service or coordinating the Applicants' facilities; and
18/

Id.

19/

Trial staff Brief on Exceptions at 6-7.

20/

Id. at 7-8.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Docket No, EC88-2-000

8-

(2) fine-tuning otherwise acceptable merger proposals that
already satisfy the statutory public interest standards. 21/
Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems also excepts to the
Initial Decision's failure to consider the wheeling policy as
proposed by trial staff and others. They further except to the
judge's failure to consider the alleged discriminatory effects of
the merger on existing wheeling rates. 22/
Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems contends that policy
considerations warrant Commission review of the Initial Decision.
They point out that this is the first case involving a merger of
this magnitude to come before the Commission under section 203 of
the FPA. Thus, they argue that this case is of unusual
significance to the electric utility industry and to the public.
They also argue that the Initial Decision includes rulings that
would sharply limit the Commission's authority to impose
conditions on future mergers or acquisitions under section 203.
Finally, they argue that since issues involving transmission
pricing and access are central to this proceeding, the
Commission's decision regarding those issues may have broad
implications for the electric industry and its regulators. 23/
Sierra Pacific and Nevada Power Company except to the
judge's failure to rule that in the event the merger is approved:
(1) the Applicants' divisional pricing proposal should be
rejected; (2) the post-merger wholesale fuel clause should be
based on all fuel clause costs of the merged company; and (3) the
merged company should be required to make an immediate rate
filing.
Washington Water Power Company excepts to the judge's
finding that opportunity cost pricing is premised on the absence
of competition and leads to double recovery because an
appropriate level of profit is already included in embedded
costs. 24/ It also excepts to the judgefs finding that profits
obtained from brokering power sales are monopoly profits since
they are based on value of service, and not on cost of
service. 25/ Washington Water Power Company states that these
findings do not adequately take into account the nature and
21/

Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems Brief on
Exceptions at 8.

22J

Id. at 8-9.

23/

Id. at 9-10.

24/

Washington Water Power Company Brief on Exceptions at 2.

2 5/

Id.
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guality of wholesale power transactions that may occur among
utilities, absent monopolistic intent or conduct. 26/
The Utah Division of Public Utilities excepts to the judgefs
finding that the Applicants failed to show that there are
substantial benefits to be achieved by the merger as well as to
the finding that the merger should be denied because the merger
benefits could be achieved by contract. 27/ It also excepts to
the judge's concern for interruptible customers whose rates and
service come under the jurisdiction of the Utah Public Service
Commission. 2SJ Finally, the Utah Division of Public Utilities
excepts to the judge's conclusion that the merger would impair
the ability of regulators to effectively regulate the merged
entity. 29/
The Public Service Commission of Wyoming excepts to the
judge's finding that regulation by state commissions would be
impaired by virtue of the size and varied operations of the
merged company. 30/ It argues that after an initial adjustment
period, regulation of the new entity poses no significant or
novel regulatory difficulties. 31/ Thus, the Public Service
Commission of Wyoming states that it fully supports the merger
and requests that the decision of the judge be overturned and the
merger approved. 32/
AMAX excepts to the judge's finding that the Commission
lacks broad authority to condition a merger. 33/ It argues that
the merger should be approved so long as its proposed conditions
regarding interruptible customers are adopted, and the Commission
finds that the merger is otherwise consistent with the public
interest. 34/
26/

Id. at 3.

27/

Utah Division of Public Utilities Brief on Exceptions
at 3.

28/

Id.

29/

Id.

30/

Public Service Commission of Wyoming Brief on
Exceptions at 2.

11/

Id. at 5-6.

32/

Id.

33/

AMAX Magnesium Corporation Brief on Exceptions at 6.

34/

Id.
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Nucor Steel excepts to the judge's construction of section
203 of the FPA as being devoid of implicit authority to fashion
conditions necessary and appropriate to assure that an otherwise
unacceptable merger becomes consistent with the public interest.
It also excepts to the judge's determination that conditions
removing or overcoming restrictions embodied in the Applicants1
wheeling policies are not necessary or appropriate to secure the
maintenance of adequate service and the coordination in the
public interest of facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission, as set forth in section 203(b). 36/ Finally, Nucor
Steel excepts to the judgefs failure to consider its proposed
conditions aimed at preventing degradation of service to UP&L's
interruptible customers. 37/
The Shareholder Association excepts to the judge's finding
that transmission service is a relevant market for purposes of
evaluating the effect of the merger on competition. 38/
Similarly, it excepts to the judge's finding that UP&L controls
essential facilities and that the merged company would exercise
undue market power. 39/ Finally, it excepts to the judge's
ruling excluding the testimony of its witness. 40/
G.

Briefs Opposing Exceptions

On July 11, 1988, Briefs Opposing Exceptions were filed by
the following parties: the Applicants; trial staff; the United
Mine Workers,fitflJL.;Sierra Pacific and Nevada Power Company;
Deseret G&T; Nucor Steel; AMAX; Utah Associated Municipal Power
Systems; the Public Power Council and Northwest Public Power
Association; NRECA/APPA, si al.; and CREDA.

35/

Nucor Steel Brief on Exceptions at 3. Pursuant to Rule
711(a)(1)(iii), 18 C.F.R. § 385.711 (1988), Sierra
Pacific and Nevada Power Company incorporate by
reference this sime exception to the judge's Initial
Decision. Brief of Sierra Pacific and Nevada Power
Company on Exceptions, filed July 11, 1988.

3j5/ Id.
12/

Id.

38/

Utility Shareholder Association of Utah Brief on
Exceptions at 5.

39/

Id.

40/

Id. at 4-5.
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The Applicants oppose the exceptions taken by trial staff,
the Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems, and Nucor Steel with
respect to the Commission's authority to require wheeling as a
condition on approval of the merger. However, the Applicants
state that the wheeling policy proposed by trial staff is
acceptable to them, and Applicants will not interpose any
objection if that wheeling policy is required as a condition on
approval of the merger. 41/
The Applicants also oppose the exceptions taken by trial
staff, the Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems, Sierra
Pacific, Washington Water Power Company, Nucor Steel, and AMAX
with respect to their proposals to modify the Applicants'
proposed wheeling policy and to impose rate conditions on
approval of the merger. 42/
Trial staff opposes the exceptions taken by the Applicants
with respect to the judge's finding that: (1) the merger would
have an adverse effect on competition; (2) the costs of the
merger would outweigh its quantifiable benefits; (3) certain
alleged benefits of the merger should be rejected on the grounds
that they are achievable by contract; (4) a method for allocating
costs between the divisions should be established prior to the
merger; and (5) the impact on the Bonneville Power
Administration's (BPA) rates cannot be determined and that rates
of other utilities may be adversely affected by the merger. 43/
Trial staff also opposes Sierra Pacific and Nevada Power
Company's exception to the judge's failure to rule that the
Applicants' post-merger jurisdictional rates must be based on
rolled-in costing and that the post-merger wholesale fuel
adjustment clause must be based on all fuel clause costs of the
merger company. 44/
Finally, trial staff opposes Utah Associated Municipal Power
Systems' exception to the Initial Decision's failure to consider
potential discriminatory effects of the merger on existing
wheeling rates. 45/ Trial staff argues that any proposed
41/

Applicants Brief Opposing Exceptions at 2-4.

12/

Id-

43/

Trial staff Brief Opposing Exceptions at 1-2.

44/

Id. at 2.

15/

Id.
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increase in the wheeling rates of the merged company can be
opposed at the time such a rate filing is made. 46/
The United Mine Workers, fit ai. oppose virtually all of the
exceptions taken by the Applicants, trial staff, 47/ the Public
Service Commission of Wyoming, the Utah Division of Public
Utilities, the Utility Shareholder Association of Utah, and the
Washington Water Power Company. 48/ They also oppose Utah
Associated Municipal Power Systems1 exception to the judge's
failure to consider the wheeling policy proposed by trial staff
and others.
CREDA opposes virtually all of the exceptions taken by the
Applicants, 49/ trial staff, the Utility Shareholders Association
of Utah, Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems, 50/ and the
Utah Division of Public Utilities. 51/ CREDA also opposes the
exceptions taken by Nucor Steel and AMAX with respect to the
judge's finding that the Commission has only narrow authority to
condition the merger.

46/

I£. at 58-9.

47/

The United Mine Workers, g£ al. do not oppose trial
staff's exception to the judge's refusal to consider
trial staff's proposal of having the merged company
file future rate filings and allocation plans at
definite times. Similarly, they do not oppose trial
staff's exception to the judge's conclusion that the
Commission lacks the authority to impose wheeling
conditions in approving the merger.

48/

United Mine Workers, gt ai. Brief Opposing Exceptions
at ix.

49/

CREDA does not oppose the Applicants' exception to the
judge's ruling that the merger may have a significant
impact on interruptible rates, that the impact on the
Bonneville Power Administration's rates cannot be
determined, and that the rates of other utilities may
be adversely affected.

50/

CREDA does not oppose Utah Associated Municipal Power
Systems' exception to the judge's failure to consider
the discriminatory effects of the merger on existing
wheeling rates.

51/

CREDA does not oppose the Utah Division of Public
Utilities' exception to the judge's concern for
interruptible customers whose rates and service fall
under its jurisdiction.
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NRECA/APPA, gt ai. oppose each of the exceptions taken by
the Applicants and trial staff. 52/ However, their brief
addresses only those exceptions relating to the effect of the
merger on competition.
The Public Power Council and Northwest Public Power
Association oppose many of the exceptions taken by the
Applicants, trial staff, the Utility Shareholder Association of
Utah, the Utah Division of Public Utilities, and the Public
Service Commission of Wyoming. 53/ However, their brief
addresses only those exceptions relating to the effect of the
proposed merger on competition and on the effectiveness of
regulation. 54/ Moreover, they adopt and support the positions
taken by NRECA/APPA, fit al. (except as to the imposition of
conditions and the appropriateness of opportunity cost pricing),
as well as the position taken by CREDA relating to costs and
benefits of the merger and the need for cost of service
information. 55/
Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems opposes the
Applicants1 exceptions to the judge's finding that the merger is
likely to lessen competition in a relevant market. 56/ Utah
Associated Power Systems, as well as AMAX, also oppose the
Applicants' exception to the judge's dismissal of the Applicants'
wheeling policy. 57/
Deseret G&T opposes the exceptions taken by Applicants
insofar as Applicants argue that their proposed wheeling policy
is equivalent to trial staff's, is supported by Deseret G&T, or
offers adequate assurance of transmission access by transmission
dependent utilities. 58/
Nucor Steel opposes virtually all of the exceptions taken by
52/

NRECA/APPA, g£ &!• Brief Opposing Exceptions at 1.

53/

Public Power Council and Northwest Public Power
Association Brief Opposing Exceptions at 1, 10-15.

54/

Id. at 4.

55/
56/

Id. at 4-5.
Utah Associated Power Systems Brief Opposing Exceptions
at 2.

57/

UAMPS Brief Opposing Exceptions at 2; AMAX Brief
Opposing Exceptions at l.

58/

Deseret G&T Brief Opposing Exceptions at 2.
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the Applicants and trial staff. 52/ It also opposes the
exceptions taken by: (1) the Public Service Commission of Wyoming
with respect to the effectiveness of regulation; (2) UAMPS with
respect to the Applicants' proposed wheeling policy; (3) the Utah
Division of Public Utilities with respect to the claimed benefits
of the merger and the effect on interruptible customers; and (4)
the Washington Water Power Company with respect to opportunity
cost pricing. 60/
Sierra Pacific and Nevada Power Company oppose the
Applicants' exception to the judge's rejection of claimed
benefits to the merger on the grounds that they are achievable by
contract. 61/ Sierra Pacific and Nevada Power Company also
oppose the Applicants' exception to the judge's finding regarding
shareholders' rights to share in the benefits of the merger, 62/
and his finding that the merger would impair effective federal or
state regulation of the merged company. 63/ Finally, Sierra
Pacific and Nevada Power Company oppose trial staff's exception
with respect to the judge's rejection of staff's proposal to
require future rate filings to correct rate problems associated
with the merger. 64/
As discussed below, we affirm the presiding judge with
respect to his finding that the proposed merger would likely
substantially lessen competition and tend to create a monopoly.
We also affirm the judge with respect to his finding that the
proposed merger could adversely effect the ability of this
Commission and the state commissions to effectively regulate the
merged entity. Thus, we find that as a result of the likely
adverse effect on competition and on the effectiveness of
regulation, the proposed merger is not consistent with the public
interest.
However, we reverse the judge with respect to his finding
that the Commission lacks the authority to adequately condition
the proposed merger. We find that there are certain terms and
conditions under which the proposed merger would be consistent
with the public interest and, moreover, that we have the
59/

Nucor Steel Brief Opposing Exceptions at 2.

60/

Id.

61/

Sierra Pacific and Nevada Power Company Brief Opposing
Exceptions at 1.

62/

Id.

63/

Id.

64/

Id.
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authority to impose such conditions. Thus, we shall
conditionally approve the proposed merger, subject to the
Applicants1 acceptance of the terms and conditions set forth
below.
II.

Procedural Motions
A.

Motion t? StriKq

On July 7, 1988, the Public Power Council and Northwest
Public Power Association filed a motion to strike portions of the
Shareholder Association's Brief on Exceptions. They argue that
the Brief on Exceptions raises issues out of time regarding the
judge's decision to strike the testimony of the Shareholder
Association's witness, 65/ and that major portions of the brief
rely solely upon the stricken testimony and contain no citations
to the record in this proceeding. They contend that the
Shareholder Association should have sought Commission review of
the judge's decision to strike the testimony through an
interlocutory appeal. 66/ They further argue that by attempting
to bring the stricken testimony before the Commission at this
stage of the proceedings, the Shareholder Association is
attempting to deprive the parties of their right to due process,
including the right to cross-examine the witness. 67/
On July 19, 1988, the Shareholder Association filed an
answer to the motion, arguing that evidentiary rulings lack the
requisite "extraordinary circumstances'1 necessary for an
interlocutory appeal. In support of its argument, the
Shareholder Association cites Trans Alaska Pipeline System. 68/
where the Commission refused to certify an appeal regarding an
evidentiary ruling made by the presiding judge. The Shareholder
Association also argues that since its witness was unavailable at
hearing due to the judge's ruling (and through no fault of its
own) there is no denial of due process.
We find that to admit the testimony of the Shareholder
Association witness at this stage of the proceedings would
infringe upon the right of the intervenors to due process. It
would be unfair to overrule the judge and consider the testimony
65/

Order Granting Motion to Exclude Testimony, issued
February 25, 1988.

66/

18 C.F.R. § 385.715 (1988).

67/

On July 11, 1988, CREDA filed an answer in support of
the Public Power Council\Northwest Public Power
Association's motion.

68/

23 FERC J 61,102 (1983).
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of a witness not subject to cross-examination, particularly where
the sponsoring party made no attempt to promptly appeal the
judge's ruling. The Shareholder Association's delay in bringing
this issue before the Commission effectively denies the
intervenors any opportunity to cross-examine the witness, or to
offer rebuttal testimony.
The Shareholder Association's delay is not excused by its
reliance on our ruling in Traps AlasKa Pipeline System. That
case involved a request for a ruling on evidence prior to its
submittal. Thus, it dealt with an issue of when evidence was
properly introduced, not whether it was admissable. Moreover,
trie Commission stated in that case that it would entertain an
interlocutory appeal on evidentiary issues upon a showing of
abuse of discretion by the presiding judge. This, in effect, is
what the Shareholder Association is alleging in arguing that the
judge improperly excluded its witness' testimony.
Thus, we will disregard the portions of the Shareholder
Association's Brief on Exceptions which rely on the testimony
stricken by the judge. We will also disregard the attachment to
the Brief on Exceptions containing the excluded testimony.
B.

Applicants' Request for Rejection of Briefs on
Exception

In their Brief Opposing Exceptions, the Applicants argue
that the Brief on Exceptions of Sierra Pacific and Nevada Power
Company should be rejected as an attempt to buttress the
conclusions of the presiding judge since the brief agrees with
substantial portions of the Initial Decision. 69/ On July 14,
1988, Sierra Pacific and Nevada Power Company filed an answer to
the Applicants' request for rejection, arguing that only a small
portion of the brief focused on the presiding judge's findings,
and, moreover, that the Applicants could not be prejudiced by
support for the Initial Decision in the Brief on Exceptions since
the Applicants then had the opportunity to criticize those
arguments in the Applicants' Brief on Exceptions.
We agree that the statements in the Brief on Exceptions of
Sierra Pacific and Nevada Power Company that support the Initial
Decision constitute only a small portion of that brief. We also
agree that the Applicants are not prejudiced by such statements
since they had the opportunity to (and, in fact, did) respond to
those statements. Thus, the Applicants' request for rejection
will be denied.
The Applicants also argue that the Brief on Exceptions of
AMAX should be disregarded since it: (1) contained a copy of
69/

Applicants Brief Opposing Exceptions at 14.
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AMAX's Initial Brief to the presiding judge; (2) failed to
include a numbered list of exceptions; and (3) contains no
citations to the record and relies on purported statements of
fact not fend in the record. 7£/ On July 21, 1988, AMAX filed a
motion for waiver of the Commission's regulations, or, in the
alternative, for leave to file a revised brief on exceptions
(attached to the motion). Since AMAXfs revised Brief on
Exceptions presents no arguments not already raised in its
original Brief on Exceptions (thus, no party will be prejudiced
by allowing its substitution), and since the revised Brief on
Exceptions now conforms to the Commission's regulations, we will
grant AMAX's request to substitute its revised brief.
C.

MPtJon Requesting 0^1 Argument

On July 11, 1988, Nucor Steel filed a motion pursuant to
Rule 711(c) of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure,
18 C.F.R. § 385.711(c) (1988), requesting oral argument before
the Commission. Nucor Steel argues that briefs alone would not
do justice to this case given its importance and the divergent
views expressed by the various parties. However, we find that
oral argument is unnecessary since the views of the parties have
been stated clearly and comprehensively in their briefs on and
opposing exceptions. Thus, Nucor Steel's motion will be denied.
D.

Post-Hearing Motion to Intervene

On October 13, 1988, the Public Utilities Authority for the
Town of Plymouth, Utah (the Authority) filed an untimely motion
to intervene. It states that it is a municipality as defined in
section 3(7) of the FPA, 71/ created on August 23, 1988 to
provide retail electric service to local residential, commercial,
and industrial customers (including Nucor Steel). The Authority
states that no other participant in this proceeding can
adequately protect its interests as a municipal electric system
and purchaser of transmission service and electricity at
wholesale.
On October 21, 1988, the Applicants filed an answer to the
Authorityfs motion. The Applicants contend that at this stage of
the proceeding, the late motion would result in additional
burdens on the existing parties. They also contend that the
Authority1s interests are adequately represented by Nucor Steel.
Given that the Authority was not created until recently, v.c
find that it had good cause not to seek intervention earlier.
Moreover, the Authority is a potential competitor of the merged
70/

Id. at 21-22.

71/

16 U.S.C § 796(7) (1982).
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company, unlike Nucor Steel which is a retail customer. Thus, we
shall grant the Authority's motion to intervene out of time.
However, we shall require that the Authority take the record as
is, so as not to prejudice or burden any of the existing parties,
or to delay these proceedings. 72/

in.

Discussion
A.

The Statutory Standard Under Section 203 of the FPA

Pursuant to section 203(a) of the FPA, a merger is to be
approved if the Commission finds that it "will be consistent with
the public interest." 73/ Under section 203(b), the Commission
may grant any application "upon such terms and conditions as it
finds necessary or appropriate to secure the maintenance of
adequate service and proper coordination in the public interest
of facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission." 74/
As we noted in our order setting this matter for hearing,
the Applicants need not show that a positive benefit to the
public will result. 25/ Rather, the Applicants are required to
fully disclose all material facts and carry the burden of showing
affirmatively that the merger is compatible with the public
interest. 76/
In Commonwealth Edison Company, et al. (Commonwealth!, 77/
the Commission set forth the following non-exclusive list of
factors that it would consider when determining whether a
proposed merger is in the public interest:
(1) the effect of the proposed action on the
Applicants' operating costs and rate levels;
(2)

the contemplated accounting treatment;

72/

See, e.g. Public Service Company of New Hampshire, et
ai*, 31 FERC 1 61,041 (1935).

7 3/

16 U.S.C. § 824b(a) (1982).

74/

16 U.S.C. § 824b(b) (1982).

75/

41 FERC at 61,752, citing Pacific Power & Light Co. v.
F.P.C., 111 F.2d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir. 1940).

76/

I£.

77/

36 FPC 927 (1966), aff'd sub nom. Utility Users League
v. FPC, 394 F. 2d 16 (7th Cir. 1968), cert, denied, 393
U.S. 953 (1968).
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the reasonableness of the purchase price;

(4) whether the acquiring utility has
coerced the to-be-acquired utility into
acceptance of the merger;
(5) the effect of the proposed merger on the
existing competitive situation; and
(6) whether the consolidation will impair
effective regulation either by this
Commission or the appropriate state
regulatory authority. 78/
In its order setting this matter for hearing, the Commission
found that there was no need to set for hearing factors "2", "3",
and "4 M . We found that: (1) the accounting treatment applied by
the Applicants is in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles and the Uniform System of Accounts; (2)
there were no allegations made and no evidence submitted that the
merger was brought about by coercion; and (3) there was no
showing that the purchase price was not reasonable. 79/ Thus, we
set for hearing those issues that relate to the remaining
enumerated factors.
Some intervenors had suggested that in addition to the
factors enumerated in Commonwealth, the Applicants must be held
to the "single integrated public utility-system" standard
contained in the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935
(PUHCA). 80/ However, in our order setting this matter for
78/

36 FPC at 932.

79/

41 FERC at 61,755.

80/

15 U.S.C. § 79j(c)(2) (1982).
utility-system11 is defined as

An "integrated public

a system consisting of one or more units of
generating plants and/or transmission lines
and/or distributing facilities, whose utility
assets, whether owned by one or more electric
utility companies, are physically
interconnected or capable of physical
interconnection and which under normal
conditions may be economically operated as a
single interconnected and coordinated system
confined in its operations to a single area
or region, in one or more States, not so
large as to impair (considering the state of
(continued...)
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hearing we stated that lfwe need not strictly apply the provisions
of PUHCA • . . . Our focus must be on the impact on the public
interest of the merged entity's operation." £1/ Thus, as noted
above, we set for hearing the issue of whether the merged
companies will be capable of being operated economically and
efficiently as a single entity, as well as the impact on the
public interest of the merged entity not operating as a single
entity to the extent such is found to be the case. 82/
B.

The Commission's Authority to Condition a Merger

As noted, the Commission has the authority to deny approval
of a merger if it is not "consistent with the public interest.11
It follows, therefore, that if the Commission can deny approval
of the proposed merger, it must also be able to take the less
restrictive step of conditioning its approval; the power to
condition approval is fairly subsumed within the broader power to
disapprove. 83/ If we were to simply deny approval of the
merger, the Applicants could then file a new application
satisfying our concerns. Conditioning approval in the first
instance achieves precisely the same result. In either case, the
Applicants can pursue the merger consistent with the terms
specified by the Commission or, if they choose, forgo the merger.
Thus, conditioning the merger so as to make it consistent with
the public interest represents no extension of the Commission's
authority.
Citing Central Maine Power Co., fii al. (Central Maine), 84/
80/(...continued)
the art and the area or region affected) the
advantages of localized management, efficient
operation and the effectiveness of
regulation. . . •
15 U.S.C. § 79(a)(29)(A) (1982).
81/

41 FERC at 61,753.

82/

Id.

83/

Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FPC, 379 F.2d 153, 158
(D.C. Cir. 1967). In that case, the court examined the
Commission's authority to conditionally license a
hydroelectric project under Part I of the FPA. The
court stated that the provisions of the FPA imply broad
Commission authority and that the FPA is not to be read
to require justification of each action by reference to
express statutory authorization. Id.

84

55 FPC 2477 (1976).
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the judge found that the C o m m i s s i o n s statutory authority to
condition a merger is narrower than its broad power to determine
whether the merger itself is consistent with the public interest.
We disagree. In Central Maine, the Federal Power Commission
found that it was "clearly empowered to reject a merger proposal
which is inconsistent with the public interest," but that its
"authority to modify the merger agreement itself is limited to
circumstances where conditions are necessary to ensure
reliability and system coordination." 86/ However, the
Commission found in that case that (even absent conditions) there
had been no showing that the proposed merger was inconsistent
wi,th the public interest. Thus, Central Maine stands only for
the proposition that the Commission's authority to condition a
merger that has been shown to be consistent with the public
interest under section 203(a) is limited to the authority
explicitly conferred by section 203(b). Since we find, as
discussed below, that the proposed merger is not consistent with
the public interest absent conditions, the statement in Central
Maine cited by the judge is inapplicable to this proceeding.
Citing Citv of Paris v. Kentucky Utilities Co. (City of
Paris). 87/ and Union Electric Co.. 88/ the judge found that the
Commission lacks the authority to order wheeling access as a
condition on its approval of the proposed merger. However, these
cases are inapposite to the instant proceeding. The Commission
merely stated in City of Paris that it lacked the authority to
order wheeling under section 202 of the FPA. 89/ That case did
not involve a merger proposal under section 203 that was found to
be inconsistent with the public interest. Similarly, although
Union Electric Co. involved a proposed merger where the
Commission refused to order wheeling, the requested wheeling
conditions were not "relevant to the merits of the merger
application" and thus were not necessary to remedy any adverse
effects of the merger. 90/ Accordingly, the Commission's
authority to order wheeling to remedy the anticompetitive effects
of a merger was not at issue in either case.

8 5/

43 FERC at 65,354.

86/

55 FPC at 2484.

87/

41 FPC 45

88/

25 FERC J 61,394

89/

16 U.S.C. § 824a (1982).
Section 202 deals primarily
with the Commission's authority to encourage and/or
order the interconnection of electric facilities.

90/

25 FERC at 61,875.

(1969).
(1983).
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Similarly, the judge1s reliance on Otter Tail Power Co. v.
U.S. rotter Tail) 21/ is misplaced. In Qtt$r Tail, the Court
found that a District Court order requiring wheeling to correct
anticompetitive practices did not conflict with the authority or
the Federal Power Commission since no authority was granted under
Part II of the Federal Power Act to order wheeling. 93/ However,
Otter Tail simply construed the Commission's power to order
interconnections under section 202 of the FPA as not carrying
with it mandatory wheeling authority. It did not address, much
less decide, how far the Commission's authority extends in
proceedings brought under section 203 to remedy the
anticompetitive effects of a merger.
The judge found that Richmond Power & Light Co. v. FERC
(Richmond) £3/ prevents the Commission from ordering wheeling in
this proceeding since "[w]hat the Commission is prohibited from
doing directly it may not achieve by indirection." 94/ In
Richmond, the Commission refused to condition its acceptance of
rates for voluntary, temporary wheeling on an agreement by the
utilities to provide continued (involuntary) wheeling. The court
affirmed the Commission's decision, finding that "[i]f Congress
had intended that utilities could inadvertently bootstrap
themselves into common-carrier status by filing rates for
voluntary service, it would not have bothered to reject mandatory
wheeling in favor of . . . voluntary wheeling." 95/
Thus, a Commission order requiring wheeling, without more,
is impermissible since it would impose common-carrier status on
the wheeling utility. In this case, however, the requirement
that the merged company wheel power is based on our finding of
likely anticompetitive effects of the merger. Accordingly (and
as distinguished from the Richmond case), a requirement that it
wheel power for competitors in order to ameliorate the likely
anticompetitive effects of the merger would not serve to make the
merged company a common-carrier. Thus, the Commission is not
doing indirectly (making the merged company a common carrier)
what it is prohibited from doing directly.

91/

410 U.S. 366 (1973).

92/

The Federal Power Act was later amended to include
certain authority to order wheeling. 16 U.S.C. §§
824i-k (1982).

93/

574 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1978).

94/

43 FERC at 65,354 citing 574 F.2d at 620.

9 5/

574 F.2d at 620.
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The Applicants cite, inter alia. New York Statefllectric&
Gas Corp. v. FERC (NYSgg) and Florida Power and Light Co, v. FERC
(Florida) 96/ as limiting the Commission's authority to order
wheeling in this proceeding. In NYSEG, the Court vacated a
Commission order issued under section 206 of the FPA that would
have resulted in an expansion of NYSEG1s voluntarily commitment
to wheel power. The court concluded that electric utilities are
not common carriers under the FPA and that the Commission's
powers to regulate transmission contracts pursuant to section 2 06
does not permit the Commission to expand a utility's commitment
to wheel. Thus, the issue before the court was whether, under
section 206, the Commission could expand a voluntary commitment
to wheel without complying with the statutory prerequisites of
sections 211 and 212 of the FPA. 97/ The Commission's authority
under section 203 to order wheeling to remedy the anticompetitive
effects of a merger was not at issue.
Similarly, in Florida the court found that a Commission
order under section 205 expanding a voluntary commitment to wheel
would impermissibly impose common carrier status on the utility.
Again, however, the Commission's authority under section 203 to
order wheeling to remedy the anticompetitive effects of a merger
was not in issue. In fact, the court specifically declined to
address the issue of "whether the Commission has authority to
compel wheeling as a remedy for specific findings of
anticompetitive activities or antitrust violations." 98/
96/

638 F.2d 388 (2d Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 454 U.S.
821; 660 F.2d 668 (5th Cir. 1981).

97/

638 F.2d at 401. Under sections 211 and 212 of the
FPA, the Commission may require one electric utility to
provide transmission service to another utility,
provided certain substantive and procedural
requirements are met. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824i-k (1982).
Under these provisions, wheeling may not be ordered
unless the Commission determines, inter alia, that
existing competitive relationships would be reasonably
preserved. 16 U.S.C. § 824j(c). We note that sections
211 and 212 do not provide a basis to order wheeling in
this proceeding since, as discussed below, the
conditions are specifically designed to ameliorate the
merged company's market power over transmission, thus
altering competitive relationships.

98/

660 F.2d at 679. We note that the cases decided under
sections 202, 205 and/or 206 (discussed above) can be
distinguished from this case. Under section 203, the
Commission has primary, affirmative authority to
determine whether a proposed merger is consistent with
(continued...)
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For the foregoing reasons, we find that the Commission has
broad authority under section 203(a) to condition approval of a
merger that would not, but for such conditions, be consistent
with the public interest. 99/ We find that this authority
includes the power to order wheeling for so long as such a
condition is necessary to avoid the likely anticompetitive
effects of a proposed merger, and the tendency of that merger to
create a monopoly. 100/
In addition to the implied authority under section 203(a) of
the FPA to condition a merger that would not otherwise be
consistent with the public interest, our authority under section
203(b) of the FPA includes the power to impose conditions on a
98/(...continued)
the public interest. In each of the other cases, there
existed a remedy at law, without resort to the FPA,
through which aggrieved parties could seek relief.
99/

We note that the recent decision in South Carolina
Public Service Authority v. FERC, No. 87-1146, slip op.
(D.C. Cir. July 5, 1988), does not conflict with our
authority to impose conditions in this proceeding. In
that case, the court ruled that the Commission lacks
the authority under Part I of the FPA to condition the
licensing of a hydroelectric project on the licensee's
agreement to provide compensation for all foreseeable
property damage caused by seismically induced dam
failure. Slip op. at 2. The court held that the FPA
does not give the Commission the authority to displace
existing tort law, a matter traditionally left to the
states, with its own rules of liability for damages
caused by licensees. The court noted that while Part I
of the FPA requires the Commission to ensure that a
project is safe before licensing, the protection of
"life, health, and property," 16 U.S.C. § 803(c)
(1982), does not equate with compensation for damage to
property, as ordered by the Commission. Slip op. at 9.
In this proceeding, however, the conditions imposed do
not conflict with existing state tort law, and,
moreover, arise under our authority under a different
section of the FPA (section 203). Thus, the imposition
of conditions in this proceeding does not conflict with
the decision in South Carolina Public Service Authority
v. FERC.

100/ We also note that section 203(b) provides that the
"Commission may from time to time for good cause shown
make such orders supplemental to any order made under
this section as it may find necessary or appropriate."
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merger that are necessary and appropriate to secure the
maintenance of adequate service and the coordination in the
public interest of facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission. As discussed below, we are conditioning our approval
of this merger on the Applicants1 agreement, inter alia, that
they wheel power for competitors under certain terms and
conditions in order to remedy the merger's likely adverse effect
on competition. As discussed below, if we were to approve the
merger without such conditions, utilities that compete with the
merged company could be denied access to the merged company's
strategically located transmission facilities. This, in turn,
could affect the coordination of jurisdictional facilities.
As we"explained in Public Service Company of New Mexico, et
al., 101/ coordination between independent utilities can be
achieved in a variety of ways. Coordination has been
successfully achieved through formal power pools - provided that
membership is widely available and transmission services readily
provided to effectuate pool transactions. Coordination can also
be achieved through "the operation of a market, supplemented by
reliability agreements." 102/ With the successful operation of a
market "through a multitude of independent decisions, the actions
of individual utilities are coordinated so that the region moves
closer to the generation configuration that would produce
electricity at lowest possible cost." 103/ Since no region-wide
power pool exists within the WSCC, the strategic dominance of the
merged company over transmission could interfere with the
coordination of jurisdictional facilities by handicapping the
operation of a well-functioning bulk power market.
Accordingly, in addition to our authority under section
203(a), we find that our authority under section 203(b) includes
the power to impose those terms and conditions that are aimed at
remedying the merger's likely adverse effect on competition since
those conditions are necessary to secure the maintenance of
adequate service and the coordination in the public interest of
facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.
The impact of the merger on coordination of jurisdictional
facilities is an additional factor that led us to impose the
conditions set forth below.
C.

The Effect on Competition
1.

The Commission's Responsibilities

101/ 25 FERC 1 61,469 (1983).
102/ 25 FERC at 62,038.
103/ 25 FERC at 62,039.
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In exercising its public interest responsibilities, the
Commission must consider the policies that underlie the antitrust
statutes. 104/ By considering antitrust and anticompetitive
issues, the Commission serves as "a first line of defense against
those competitive practices that might later be the subject of
antitrust proceedings.11 105/ Thus, the Commission is obligated
to consider possible anticompetitive consequences flowing from a
proposed merger, and allegations of anticompetitive conduct may
properly be raised in proceedings under section 203 of the
FPA. 106/
We note, however, that the Commission is not strictly bound
by, and not empowered to enforce, the antitrust laws; they are
employed to give understandable content to the broad statutory
concept of the public interest. 107/ It is our responsibility to
make findings related to the pertinent antitrust statutes and
weigh them along with other important public interest
considerations. 108/
2.

The Applicable Antitrust Statutes

The antitrust statute that sets forth the basic legal
standard generally applicable to mergers is Section 7 of the
Clayton Act. 109/ It prohibits an acquisition or merger where in
any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of
such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or
to tend to create a monopoly."
Mergers and acquisitions may also violate the Sherman Act as
an agreement or combination in restraint of trade (Section 1) or
the willful acquisition or exercise of monopoly power (Section
2). In determining whether a merger violates Clayton Act § 7
because it tends to create a monopoly, precedent under the
Sherman Act is relevant in considering what amounts to monopoly
104/ Gulf States Utilities Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747, 758-60
(1973); FPC v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 279 (1976).
105/ 411 U.S. at 760.
106/ 411 U.S. at 757.
107/ Northern Natural Gas Co- v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953, 960
(D.C. Cir. 1968), citing California v. FPC, 369 U.S.
482, 490 (1962). Similarly, the Commission does not
have jurisdiction to determine violations of the
antitrust laws.
108/ Id.

109

15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982) .
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power and what constitutes a significant increase in market or
monopoly power. 110/
Thus, consistent with its obligation to take into account
the policies underlying the antitrust statutes, the Commission
directed the parties to address at hearing whether the proposed
merger would tend to create a monopoly and whether it would be
likely to substantially lessen competition. 111/ We also set for
hearing the issue of whether the merged company would have
control over facilities that are essential to participation in
the bulk sales market. 112/
3.

Analysis of the Effect on Competition

As discussed below, we affirm the judge with respect to his
finding that the proposed merger is likely to result in a
substantial lessening of competition in the relevant product and
geographic markets. 113/ We find that UP&L presently exercises
monopoly power in regard to its essential transmission
facilities. We further find that the merger of UP&L's
transmission facilities with PP&L's generation and transmission
facilities would enhance that ability to exercise monopoly power.
Thus, we conclude that the potential adverse effect on
competition that would likely result from the merger is
inconsistent with the policies underlying the antitrust statutes.
a.

The Relevant Markets

The first step in assessing the likely effect of a proposed
merger on competition is to define the relevant product and
geographic markets that will be affected. 114/ In this case, the
relevant product markets include bulk power and transmission.
The presiding judge correctly determined that transmission is a
separate product market from the bulk power market since it can
110/ Section 7 of the Clayton Act was enacted to enhance the
Sherman Antitrust Act by arresting mergers that tend to
lessen competition "in their incipiency and well before
they have attained such effects as would justify a
Sherman Act proceeding." S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 4-5 (1950) (quoted in Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 318 n.32 (1962)).
!?!/•41 FERC at 61,754.

1 W Id113/ 43 FERC at 65,359.
114/ United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351
U.S. 377, 391-93 (1956).
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be sold separately and.one product cannot be substituted for the
other. They exist at separate levels in the vertical structure
of the electric industry. 115/ All parties addressing the issue
agree that bulk power also constitutes a relevant product market.
The relevant geographic market for bulk power consists of
the geographic area covered by the member systems of the Western
Systems Coordinating Council (WSCC) since this is the area within
which the merging companies compete, and within which buyers can
reasonably turn to purchase bulk power. 117/
The relevant geographic markets for transmission include the
transmission paths, described below, through which the relatively
low-cost power generated in the Northwest Power Pool Area
(Northwest) may be delivered to markets in the Southwest
(California, southern Nevada, and the Desert Southwest), where
the majority of bulk power purchasers in the WSCC are
located. 118/ Similarly, the transmission facilities connecting
the Rocky Mountain Area of the WSCC with the Northwest constitute
a relevant geographic market.
Applicants argue that these transmission paths are not
relevant geographic markets. 119/ We disagree. There are two
significant general transmission paths through which the abundant
low-cost power generated in the Northwest can be sold to buyers
115/ Ex. 178 at 14; Ex. 84 at 14; Ex. 99 at 2. We note
that, although the Applicants argue to the contrary,
all intervenors that addressed this issue, together
with trial staff, found transmission to be a separate
relevant product market. Id. See also Town of Massena
v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 1980-2 CCH Trade Cases 1
63,526 at 76,798 (N.D.N.Y. 1980), where the court found
that generation, transmission, and distribution service
each constitute an identifiable product market.
116/ See, e.g.. Ex. 14 at 9-10; Ex. 178 at 15; and Ex. 84 at
42-43.
117/ Ex. 178 at 16; Ex. 84 at 44-46. We recognize that
limitations on transmission access can inhibit the
efficient functioning of that market by precluding some
transactions from being made. However, the WSCC
represents the overlying area within which them main
bulk electricity competition occurs. Ex. 84 at 45-46.
118/ Ex. 84 at 18. The Desert Southwest is comprised of the
Arizona-New Mexico subregion of the WSCC. Id.
119/ Applicants Brief On Exceptions at 19-23.
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in the Southwest. 120/ The concentration of potential bulk power
purchasers in the Southwest makes access to the transmission
facilities connecting these regions to the resource-rich
Northwest critical to the effectiveness of competition. 121/
Thus, we find that these two major transmission paths connecting
the Northwest to the Southwest are relevant geographic markets.
Similarly, transmission capacity between the Rocky Mountain
area and the Northwest is important to reducing power costs in
the WSCC, since, when surplus hydroelectric power is unavailable,
a large part of the WSCC relies on coal-fired resources from the
Rocky Mountain area. 122/ Thus, transmission linking the two
areas also constitutes a relevant geographic market.
b.

The Transmission Markets

The transmission markets through which bulk power can be
delivered to the Southwest consist of an eastern and western
corridor. 123/ The western corridor consists primarily of the
A.C. and D.C. Pacific Interties, which are predominantly
controlled by BPA, while Portland General Electric Company and
PP&L both control smaller shares. 124/ The eastern corridor
120/ 43 FERC at 65,344; Ex. 178 at 33-34; Ex. 80 at 4.
Utilities in the California-southern Nevada area
aggressively seek economy energy purchases throughout
the WSCC due to the high percentage of relatively
expensive gas and oil fired generation in that area.
43 FERC at 65,344; Ex. 214, Sch. 5. Hydroelectric
resources, which have the lowest marginal operating
costs of bulk power resources located within the WSCC,
are heavily concentrated in the Northwest. 43 FERC at
65,344; Ex. 15, Schs. 9, 11. There is also a
substantial supply of low marginal cost coal-fired
generation in the Northwest Power Pool area which is
not committed to native load customers. Ex. 207 at 20.
121/ 43 FERC at 65,344 and 65,358.
122/ Ex. 211 at 19.

113/ Id.
124/ Id. The A.C. Pacific Intertie has a combined capacity
of 3200 MW, of which PP&L has a 300 MW entitlement. Ex,
80 at 7. Portland General Electric Company has an 800
MW entitlement to the A.C. Pacific Intertie, with the
remaining 2100 MW controlled by the BPA. Id. The D.C.
Pacific Intartie has a capacity of 1956 MW, all of
which is controlled by BPA. Id. at 9. In addition to
(continued...)
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consists of the entire east side of the WSCC transmission grid,
although access for Northwest producers is predominantly
controlled by UP&L and PP&L. 125/
By combining the transmission facilities of UP&L and PP&L,
PacifiCorp Oregon would effectively control access by Northwest
sellers to the Southwest through the eastern corridor. For
access using the eastern corridor, Northwest sellers would be
essentially limited to one of the three interconnection points at
Mona, Glen Canyon, or Four Corners, each of which will be
controlled by the merged company. 126/ Although PacifiCorp would
control a smaller share of the western corridor, BPA controls the
predominant share through its control of the Pacific Interties.
Thus, sellers in the Northwest seeking to sell power into
the Southwest would essentially be limited to transmission

124/(...continued)
the Interties, the western corridor also contains a 100
MW capacity transmission line owned by PP&L. Thus, the
combined capacity of the western corridor is 5256 MW,
of which 4056 MW is controlled by BPA, 800 MW by
Portland General Electric Company, and 400 MW by PP&L.
125/ Ex. 178 at 34-36; Ex. 80 at 19-20. For access to the
Southwest, the primary alternative to lines owned by
UP&L is the Intermountain Power Project (IPP) D.C. line
(1920 MW). However, access to the IPP line for
Northwest sellers can effectively be obtained only
through UP&L's Mona substation. Ex. 80 at 12.
Therefore, UP&L effectively controls access to the IPP
line.
The eastern corridor also contains some low-capacity
transmission lines owned by the Western Area Power
Administration (WAPA) and others that do not provide
significant access to the Southwest. Ex. 80 at 14-16.
In addition, there are three small transmission lines
that require transmission around UP&L's system through
Colorado for power to be sold to the Southwest.
However, these three lines are not economically
feasible alternatives for most of these transactions
since, among other reasons, wheeling charges would have
to be paid to at least three other utilities and such
transactions would involve substantial transmission
line losses. Ex. 80 at 17.
126/ Exs. 80 and 81.
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facilities controlled by BPA or the merged company. 127/ Access
through BPA, however, must conform to BPA's Intertie access
policies that restrict the ability of utilities to engage in both
firm and non-firm sales, 128/ Moreover, the Interties provide
meaningful access only to California and not to the Desert
Southwest. Therefore, as found by the judge, the merger would
give the Applicants strategic dominance over transactions from
the Northwest into the Southwest. 129/
The Applicants attempted to demonstrate that alternative
transmission paths do, in fact, exist for sales into the
Southwest. 130/ They asserted that there are three transmission
lines that could be used to transmit power through the IPP line
into California, thus avoiding UP&I/s control of access to that
line through UP&L's Mona substation. 131/ However, each of these
127/ Ex. 80 at 20. The merged company's dominance over
transmission to the Southwest, as further described
below, is derived from its strategic location which
permits it to control power flows to those markets.
Moreover, an evaluation of the concentration of
ownership of transmission facilities (rather than
control) leads to the same conclusion. The Applicants1
own analysis, using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI), confirms that ownership of transmission capacity
is highly concentrated pre-merger, and will be even
more concentrated post-merger. The HHI is a measure of
concentration of ownership in a relevant market. Under
the 1984 Merger Guidelines of the Department of
Justice, 2 Fed. Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 4490 (June 29, 1984),
a merger in a highly concentrated market (i.e., with an
HHI index exceeding 1800) will likely be challenged if
the increase in the index exceeds 50 points.
Applicants' own witness Landon calculated a pre-merger
HHI of 3029 and a post-merger HHI of 3091, yielding an
increase of 62. Ex. 213 at 34.
128/ Ex. 80 at 20.
129/ 4 3 FERC at 65,358. We find Idaho Power Company witness
Durickfs analysis showing the merged company's
dominance over transmission into the Southwest to be a
well-reasoned and accurate assessment. Exs. 80 and 81.
130/ Ex. 212, Sch. 3 at 2.
131/ Tr. 3276-77. Applicants' witness Tucker also argues
that utilities anywhere along the eastern transmission
corridor have equal control over access to the
Southwest because of their "mutual dependent
(continued...)
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alternatives is either non-existent or not feasible: one line,
(the only direct north-south path) is owned by UP&L; the second
line (Gonder-IPP) is presently not operable; and the third line
(Bonanza-Mc~>a, an east-west line) involves a circuitous route
around UP&L's system that is not economically feasible. 132/
There is also substantial transmission capacity connecting
the Rocky Mountain area of the WSCC with the Northwest. As noted
above, transmission capacity between these two areas is important
to reducing power costs in the WSCC. PP&L controls the largest
share of that capacity, with a 72.5 percent market share. 133/
UP&L controls the next largest share (15.7 percent). 134/ As a
result of the merger, PP&L and UP&L would combine their control
of existing transmission between the Northwest and the Rocky
Mountain area, resulting in a combined market share of 88-.2
percent. 135/
c.

Foreclosure of Competition from the
Transmission Market

As discussed below, the record establishes that prior to the
merger (even without the additional transmission control that
would result from the merger) UP&Lfs transmission system
constitutes an essential facility since: (1) UP&L's system is
controlled by a monopolist; (2) competitors are unable to
economically duplicate it; (3) its use has been denied to
131/(...continued)
relationship" which dictates that each company can not
arbitrarily exercise control to exclude the others. Ex.
211 at 5. However, UP&L's has admitted, as discussed
below, that it has never provided firm wheeling to the
major Northwest suppliers for sales into the Southwest.
This shows that the alleged "mutual dependent
relationship" has not prevented UP&L from foreclosing
competitors by denying access to the Southwest at its
interconnection points.
132/ Tr. 3275-78; Ex. 80 at 17.
133/ EX. 178 at 56.
114/ Id.

135/ Ex. 178 at 56. Thus, HHI calculations for the
transmission market between the Rocky Mountain area and
the Northwest Power Pool area show a pre-merger index
of 5,643, with an increase of 2,277 points as a result
of the merger. Ex. 178 at 46, 56.
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competitors; and (4) it is feasible to make the facilities
available to competitors. 136/
First, as demonstrated above, UP&L controls access to the
Southwest along the eastern corridor through its three
interconnection points at Mona, Four Corners, and Glen Canyon.
Virtually all sales by Northwest suppliers using the eastern
corridor must pass through one of these points. Second, it is
not economically feasible for competitors to duplicate UP&L!s
transmission facilities within a reasonable time due to barriers
to entry in the construction of direct transmission paths from
the Northwest to the Southwest. 137/ The Applicants1 own witness
testified that he was unable to cite an instance in which a major
transmission line was built anywhere within three years. 138/
Third, UP&L has exercised this monopoly control by
foreclosing competitors from using its transmission facilities to
sell power at UP&Lfs southern interconnections. As found by the
judge, UP&L has consistently refused to permit the wheeling of
low-cost power across its system in order to use its
strategically located bottleneck to extract monopoly prices. 139/
136/ See MCI Communications v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708
F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983); Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.
v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1520-21 (10th Cir.
1984), aff d 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
137/ Ex 178 at 66-68. These barriers include: (1) the
combination of the great distances involved and the
need to build to high voltages in order to obtain
economies of scale and reduce transmission losses in
operation; this results in high cost as well as the
need to construct on a joint basis. I£.; (2) since the
Federal government is the major landowner in the
western United States, siting and environmental impacts
requirements must be met - adding significant cost and
delay. X&.; (3) transmission in Utah must be approved
by the Utah Public Utility Commission. Utilities,
other than those located in Utah, may find it difficult
to obtain approval to construct transmission through
Utah without UP&L's cooperation. 1^. at 68-69. UP&L
has actively sought to prevent other utilities from
building transmission in Utah. See NRECA/APPA Brief
Opposing Exceptions at 71-74; and (4) it takes several
years for entry into transmission even under
cooperative conditions among competing utilities and
longer under uncooperative conditions. Ex. 178 at 70.
138/ Tr. az 3555.
139/ 43 FERC at 65,357; Tr. 3575-76; Ex. 325.
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Moreover, UP&L admits that it has never provided firm wheeling
service to any major Northwest utility wishing to sell to buyers
in the Desert Southwest, southern Nevada or California. 140/
Fourth, it is clearly feasible for UP&L to provide
transmission service to competitors, since, instead of wheeling
for its competitors, UP&L has bought the low cost, hydroelectric
and coal power at its northern interconnection points and sold it
at its southern interconnection points. 141/ Accordingly, we
find that UPfrL's transmission system is presently an essential
facility controlled by a monopolist (UP&L).
Following the merger, PacifiCorp Oregon would control the
essential facilities previously owned by UP&L, as well as PP&L's
transmission facilities. As a result, PacifiCorp Oregon would
have enhanced ability to exercise monopoly power over
transmission in the relevant geographic markets. This increased
control of transmission between the Northwest and the Southwest,
as well as the Rocky Mountain area, enhances the merged company's
ability to foreclose competition for sales of bulk power. 142/
d.

Anticompetitive Effects

The ability to foreclose competition can result in two
types of anticompetitive harms. First, by refusing to wheel lowcost power from the Northwest, the merged company could instead
buy the power, and, in reselling it, extract monopoly profits.
Second, the merged company could give preference to its own
generation over that of competitors for sales into southwestern
markets (even when the latter is cheaper).
"The traditional starting point for determining the
existence of monopoly power is to compare prices with incremental
costs." 143/ By refusing to wheel power and instead engaging in
buy/sell transactions, UP&L is able to charge a price that
reflects more than the cost of the transmission service it
140/ Tr. 411.
141/ Ex. 84 at 54-55.
142/ 43 FERC at 65,359. Moreover, if transmission lines
presently under construction or planned in the near
term are completed, the merged company's control over
transmission could be further increased by connecting
eastern and western generation. This could result in
even further enhancement of the ability to exercise
monopoly power. I£. at 65,358.
143/ Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 38 FERC J 61,242 at 61,801
(1987) .
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provides. 144/ For example, in 1986 UP&L paid an average of 9.5
mills for Northwest power and sold power at its Four Corners
interconnection in the Southwest at 19 mills, a difference that
far exceeds conventional wheeling charges. 145/ We note that
nowhere in the record has UP&L claimed that its cost of
transmission service supported the effective price that it was
charging for such service. UP&L's sales of power at a price that
is maintained at a level far exceeding its costs, coupled with
its ownership and control over essential transmission facilities,
demonstrates its market power to extract monopoly profits.
In addition to its ability to engage in buy/sell
transactions, the merged company could use its market power in
transmission to sell PP&L's excess coal-generated capacity to
buyers in the Southwest, displacing cheaper northern
alternatives. PP&L's coal-generated capacity comprises
approximately 52% of its total generating capacity, 146/ some of
which PP&L is unable to sell. 147/ Pre-merger, PP&L was unable
to get this power to the Southwest because it could not compete
with cheaper alternatives for the limited transmission capacity
available. 148/ Following the merger, the merged company will be
144/ Ex. 84 at 54-55.
145/ Id. In fact, in 1985 the average price for economy
energy sales by UP&L at Four Corners was 28 to 30 mills
before falling to 19 mills in 1986, Ma year of
unusually low oil and gas prices.H I£. at 65. In
contrast, marginal operating costs of the major
Northwest suppliers were considerably less. I£. at 6264. For example, Montana Power Company's marginal
generating units are coal fired, with a running cost of
8 mills. I£. Idaho Power Company can often sell
hydroelectric power at a negligible operating cost in
the Spring, and it has excess coal generation at 14-15
mills. Id. These cost differences between Northwest
and Southwest suppliers result from the fact that about
two-thirds of the generation in the Northwest is from
hydroelectric facilities, and coal units supply another
one-quarter, while more than one-half of the generation
in the California-southern Nevada market is produced by
more expensive gas and oil units. Ex. 214, Sch. 5.
Ex. 8 at 13; Ex. 9, Sch. 5.
Tr. 2473-74.
148/ Id. As discussed above, n.136, the record indicates
that both Montana Power Company and Idaho Power Company
have cheaper power available with which PP&L is at a
(continued...)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Docket No. EC88-2-000

-36-

able to market its more expensive coal-fired generation in the
Southwest while denying access to other sellers with less
expensive generation. 149/ Moreover, the Applicants have
testified that they expect to be able to sell this power as a
result of the merger. 150/ Thus, we find that following the
merger, there is a substantial likelihood that the merged company
would give preference to its own bulk power, while denying access
to competing sellers.
The record indicates that UP&L has in the past engaged in
inefficient transactions in order to avoid the possibility that
seme of its generation might be excluded from rate base as not
"used and useful." A study prepared for PP&L was used by PP&L in
evaluating whether to pursue the merger. 151/ That study
concludes that in light of UP&L's very large surplus of capacity
as compared to its load, instead of using cheaper energy, UP&L is
running generating units it otherwise would not in order to avoid
the "used and useful" issue. 152/ The study further concludes
that UP&L is thus incurring a higher level of cost than if UP&L
were running its system efficiently, 153/ With the addition of
PP&L's excess generating capacity to UP&L's excess capacity, the
148/(...continued)
competitive disadvantage in seeking access to the lines
to the Southwest that UP&L controls. Ex. 84 at 62-64.
149/ Enhanced control over transmission is not necessary to
give the merged company the ability to displace cheaper
alternatives with its own power. The merged company's
ability to favor its own generation arises from the
vertical combination of essential transmission
facilities with PP&L's excess generation. 43 FERC at
65,344. In contrast, the merged company's enhanced
ability to foreclose competition, as discussed above,
is brought about by the increase in control over
transmission resulting from the merger.
2473-74.
151/ EX. 41.
152/ I£. at 5.
153/ Id. UP&L's ability to engage in this inefficient
practice is further evidence of its market power over
transmission.
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merged company would have more reason to engage in this practice.
154/
Further evidence of an incentive to the merged company to
use its own higher-cost generation over lower-cost alternatives
is a concern expressed by UP&L at a meeting with PP&L "that
deregulation will put a •claim1 on their unused transmission
unless put to firm use.11 155/ Thus, the merger would enable the
merged company to use excess PP&L generation (which would then be
the merged company's own generation) to avoid such a result•
The displacement of competitors1 lower-cost generation with
PP&L's higher-cost power is likely to produce a substantial
adverse effect on competition and harm to consumers. Where more
expensive generation would displace cheaper generation there will
be a loss of economic efficiency. Generation in the Northwest
would not be produced at the lowest cost, while the underutilization of cheaper sources would distort investment signals,
resulting in less than optimal investment in those sources.
We note that "the use of monopoly power attained in one
market to gain a competitive advantage in another is a violation
of § 2 [of the Sherman Act]. . ." 156/ We are unpersuaded by the
merged company's assurances that it will not deny access to
competitors in the future. We agree with the judge that the
record is devoid of any evidence that could lead to any other
conclusion. 157/
Thus, we find that even taking into account the potential
benefits to be realized from the merger, discussed below, the
merger as proposed is not consistent with the public interest as
a result of its likely adverse effect on competition.
4.

Conditions to Ameliorate the Potential Adverse
Effect; <?n Competition

As discussed above, following the merger the merged company
will be able to use its control over transmission to foreclose
154/ Although UP&L is not buying all the low-cost power that
it could, it still purchases substantial quantities.
UP&L Form No. 1 data, 1986 and 1987. Thus, after the
merger, PP&L's generation could displace even more of
the available lover-cost generation.
155/ Ex. 98.
156/ Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263,
276 (2d Cir. 1979).
157/ 43 FERC at 65,341.
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competition in the relevant product and geographic markets. We
believe that the conditions set forth below are the minimum
necessary to alleviate these likely anticompetitive effects so as
to make the merger consistent with the public interest.
The conditions are designed to provide a long-term remedy to
the likely anticompetitive effects of the merger. Thus, we are
imposing an absolute obligation on the merged company to provide
firm wholesale transmission service at cost-based rates to any
utility 158/ that requests such service. This long-term
obligation is necessary to prevent the merged company from
exercising its market power to foreclose access by competitors to
bulk power markets in the future.
In addition, we are imposing short-term conditions designed
to ameliorate the exercise of monopoly power by the merged
company during a five-year transitional period necessary until
the long-term conditions can become effective. During the
transition period, a portion of the merged company's transmission
system will be set aside for use by third parties. This shortterm allocation will inhibit the merged company's ability to
foreclose competitors who wish to use its transmission system.
a.

The Applicants' Proposed Wheeling Conditions

The Applicants' proposed wheeling policy states, inter alia,
that the merged company would provide firm wheeling service
through its transmission system on a case-by-case basis. 159/
The Applicants state that, in general, wheeling will be allowed
if it does not jeopardize the merged company's system or impair
reliable service and if the merged company is allowed to price
the service so as to recover its embedded costs plus lost
economic benefits (opportunity costs). 160/
We find this policy to be inadequate. 161/ First, the
Applicants' proposed wheeling policy is not likely to result in
meaningful access to the merged company's transmission system.
Moreover, nothing contained in the wheeling policy proposed by
Applicants would prevent them from unduly preferring their own
higher-cost generation over competitors' cheaper alternatives.

158/ "Utilities'1 shall not include Qualifying Facilities as
defined in section 292.101(b)(1) of the Commission's
regulations. 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(1) (1988).
159/ Applicants Brief on Exceptions at 47.
160/ Id. at 47-48.
161/ See 43 FERC at 65,344-47.
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Second, while opportunity cost pricing may, under certain
conditions, provide a useful measure of the value of scarce
transmission resources, the Applicants1 proposal for determining
opportunity costs is overly vague and possibly unworkable.
Further, we agree with various intervenors that opportunity cost
pricing, as proposed by Applicants, would simply provide a
mechanism for the merged entity to collect monopoly rents
associated with a scarce or constrained resource (the merged
transmission system). If allowed to retain the monopoly profits
associated with these "congestion costs", the Applicants would
have no incentive to alleviate the congestion. As noted by staff
witness Mosher,
the merging companies have definite
incentives to withhold capacity from the
market . . . to drive the price up, provided
that such actions will not bring additional
capacity into the market, or lead to
regulatory sanctions. . . . If realistic
alternatives are few, then congestion
pricing, combined with the control of the
capacity available . . . is very likely to
result in the exercise of monopoly
power. 162/
Finally, the case-by-case approach proposed by the
Applicants for determining whether the merged company will
provide firm wheeling will likely result in numerous Commission
proceedings under section 206 of the FPA to determine whether
wheeling was improperly denied.
In contrast, the long-term obligation that we are imposing
is designed to remedy the likely anticompetitive effects of the
merger by requiring that competitors receive non-discriminatory
access to the bottleneck transmission facilities of the merged
company. Furthermore, pricing for such service will be at a
cost-based rate. 163/ Finally, it is hoped that the long-term
162/ Ex. 100 at 22.
163/ "Cost-based" in not intended to suggest rates that are
limited to embedded cost. However, we do not
contemplate including opportunity costs in such rates,
and in any event, opportunity cost pricing as proposed
by Applicants will not be permitted. Where additional
capacity is needed to meet a request, rates may be
designed to specifically assign the cost of that
capacity addition to the party requesting service. We
do not preclude the possibility that such costs will
subsequently be allocated to other beneficiaries of the
additional capacity.
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obligation to provide non-discriminatory transmission service
described below will simplify and streamline the administrative
process.
The short-term conditions set forth a procedure to identify
a portion of the merged company's transmission system that will
be made available to utilities as an interim measure. The shortterm conditions are designed to remain in effect until the merged
company is required to meet its long-term obligation to satisfy
all bona fide firm wholesale wheeling requests. This set-aside
and allocation approach, unlike the Applicants1 proposal, ensures
meaningful access to competitors on the merged company's
transmission system during the transition period.
b.

Conditions to be Imposed
i.

Transition Period Conditions
(a).

Access to Existing Capacity

As part of its compliance filing in this proceeding, the
merged company shall identify that portion of its total transfer
capacity that could be used for firm deliveries by wheeling
customers at particular points of delivery. The portion so
identified will be designated "Remaining Existing Capacity."
Remaining Existing Capacity shall equal the difference between
the merged company's total transmission capacity and that
capacity needed to serve both its native load customers and
customers under firm contracts entered into prior to the merger
application. After the Remaining Existing Capacity is
identified, the merged company shall make such capacity available
to requesting utilities as quickly as possible. 164/
Remaining Existing Capacity shall be divided into three
tiers in the following percentages: Transmission Dependent
Utilities 165/ shall have a right to 20% of the Remaining
Existing Capacity (Tier 1); unaffiliated utilities connected to
the merged company to the north and to the merged company's
164/ Various intervenors have proposed setting aside some of
the merged company's transmission capacity for use by
others. See, e.g. United Mineworkers, e£ al. Brief
Opposing Exceptions, Append. A.
165/ Transmission Dependent Utilities are those utilities
that are dependent on the merged company for
transmission access to their load or resources, and
includes Deseret Generation and Transmission Cooperative, Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems,
Inc. and its present members, and the present members
of the Utah Municipal Power Association.
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eastern division shall have a right to 30% of the Remaining
Excess Capacity (Tier 2); and the remaining 50% of such capacity
will be available to any utility, including the merged company
(Tier 3).
Within ninety days following the time the merged company
announces that the Remaining Existing Capacity is available,
eligible utilities shall file with the merged company all
executed contracts which they have negotiated for firm capacity
and energy which would utilize the Remaining Existing Capacity.
For each respective tier, each entity announcing an executed
contract shall be designated a Qualifying Entity11 for purposes
of the allocation process.
If, at the end of the ninety-day period, the transmission
capacity required to meet the obligations under such executed
contracts exceeds the Remaining Existing Capacity in any
particular tier, the merged company shall allocate the Remaining
Existing Capacity among the Qualifying Entities in proportion to
the contract demands of the executed contracts.
In Tier 1 and Tier 2, the allocation of transmission
capacity to the Qualifying Entity shall continue for the length
of the underlying contract. Regardless of the length of
contracts in Tier 3, the allocation of capacity in that tier
shall not exceed five years from the date the capacity becomes
available. 166/
If, at the end of the ninety day period, the transmission
capacity required to meet the obligation under such executed
contracts is less than the Remaining Existing Capacity in Tier 1
or Tier 2, subsequent wholesale transmission requests in such
tier will be honored on a first-come, first-served basis. If,
after one year, the Remaining Excess Capacity is still
undersubscribed in Tier 1 or Tier 2, any unused capacity shall
revert to the merged company for use in Tier 3.
If, in Tier 3, at the end of the ninety day period, the
transmission capacity required to meet the obligation under
executed contracts is less than the Remaining Existing Capacity,
then Trial Staff's revised wheeling policy 167/ with certain
^
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166/ We recognize that some utilities may require firm
transmission capacity for a term longer than five
years. Pursuant to the merged company's obligation to
serve, described below, such utilities may request that
capacity be provided to supplement its share of
capacity obtained through the short-term allocation.
167/ Trial Staff's revised wheeling policy is attached
hereto as Appendix A.
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ehangco proposed by the Utah Associated Municipal rower Oystemj
will apply to third party requests for wholesale transmission
service for the remainder of the five year period.
For the first and second tiers, the merged company shall be
compensated for wheeling service at a rate to be determined in a
section 205 filing following the designation of Qualifying
Entities. For a period of five years following the effective
date of the proposed rates, such rates shall be based on the
merged company's embedded costs. After five years, the
Commission may consider costing methods other than embedded cost,
consistent with general transmission pricing policy. However,
opportunity cost pricing as proposed by the Applicants will not
be permitted.
Rates in Tier 3 will also be determined in a section 205
filing following designation of the Qualifying Entities. Those
rates shall be cost-based, but not necessarily limited to
embedded costs. Again, opportunity cost pricing as proposed by
the Applicants will not be permitted. The merged company will
make available for ratepayer relief funds it collects in excess
of embedded cost during the transition period, with allocation of
the excess fund to be determined in a rate case under section
205.
Firm wheeling would also be required within those
"integrated service areas" as described by the Applicants 168/
within which they acknowledge that the merged company will be
generally unconstrained in its ability to respond to requests to
transmit power in the quantities that can be reasonably expected. jjSj
When both the source and the point of delivery are within one its
integrated service areas, the Applicants have agreed to provide
wheeling service as a matter of course to a requesting utility
unless the amount of power to be wheeled exceeds the engineering
limitations of the merged company's system. To the extent
additions to the merged company's transmission facilities are
necessary to provide firm wheeling within an integrated service
area and are technically feasible, the merged company shall
construct such additions if sufficient lead time is provided and
a contract term is agreed upon that is adequate to economically
support the facilities required. We believe that five years is a
1.6P/ These integrated service areas shall be subject to
revision based upon subsequent changes to the physical
capabilities and contractual limitations under which
the merged company operates its transmission system.
Thus, they shall be expanded as the merged company's
transmission system is upgraded.
169/ Applicants Brief on Exceptions, Appendix A.
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reasonable length of time within which to construct these
additional facilities.
Any agreement regarding the transmission capacity obtained
through the allocation process jhall not contain any provision
restraining whatever rights exist under the FPA to re-sell or reassign that capacity.
(b)

Participation bv Other Utilities in
Transmission Construction

We are adopting the trial staff's revised conditions,
with minor modifications proposed by the Utah Associated
Municipal Power System's, regarding participation by third
parties in transmission capacity additions by the merged company.
170/
With respect to the construction of transmission facilities
of voltage levels of 345 kV or higher and subject to applicable
state regulatory approval, the merged company shall afford other
utilities the opportunity to participate in the project, provided
that: (a) the potential participants have a legitimate interest
or service-related purpose in such participation, (b) the joint
participation will not unreasonably delay the project or render
it impractical for the merged company as a matter of economics or
engineering, (c) the potential participants are prepared to
equitably share in the costs and benefits of the project,
considering the cost of the project, the value of the merged
company's existing investment in related facilities and the
benefits to be derived by each party, and (d) the utility
requesting the opportunity to participate has not unreasonably
denied the merged company's participation in comparable projects.
With respect to Transmission Dependent Utilities, where the
merged company initiates transmission capacity expansion, it
shall agree to joint participation in upgrades, improvements or
additions to backbone transmission (138 kV or higher),
interconnections and substation facilities of the division of the
merged company that serves them so that such utilities may,
subject to applicable state regulatory approval, reasonably
participate in the project, provided that: (a) the potential
participants have a legitimate interest or service-related
purpose in such participation, (b) the joint participation will
not unreasonably delay the project or render it impractical for
the merged company as a matter of economics or engineering and
(c) the potential participants are prepared to equitably share in
the costs and benefits of the project considering the cost of the

70/ Utah Associated Municipal Power System Brief on
Exceptions.
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project, the value of the merged company's existing investment in
related facilities and the benefits to be derived by each party.
When requested by a Transmission Dependent Utility, the
merged company shall not unreasonably withhold its consent for
upgrades, improvements or additions to interconnections,
transmission and substation facilities located within an
Integrated Service Area, and subject to applicable state
regulatory approval, provided that: (a) the requesting utility
pays for the upgrades, improvements or additions, (b) the
upgrades, improvements or additions are required to serve the
retail or wholesale customers of the Transmission Dependent
Utility, (c) the upgrades, improvements or additions are
consistent with the merged company's engineering and construction
standards, and (d) the parties are able to agree upon a fair
allocation among them, or in the absence of such agreement, the
requesting utility is prepared to equitably allocate the
additional resulting transfer capability considering the cost of
the project and the value of the merged company^ existing
investment in related facilities.
ii.

Long-Term Obligation to Serve

The merged company will be required to provide firm 171/
wholesale transmission service to any electric utility requesting
it at a cost-based rate. The merged company will be required to
meet all bona fide requests for service either by using its
existing capacity or by building new facilities. The ultimate
decision whether to build would remain with the merged company.
In either event, the merged company will be obligated to plan and
construct its system to accommodate all such requests. However,
no requests for service need be fulfilled if doing so would
interfere or disrupt the merged company's transmission
obligations imposed during the transition period described in
section i. above.
The company will be required to use due diligence to meet
all bona fide requests for service by electric utilities. We
recognize, of course, that a reasonable period of time will be
necessary to meet requests for which capacity must be
constructed. Once a request for service is made, however, in r:
event will the company be allowed more than five years to prcv:..
such service. We believe that five years is a reasonable maxi
period of time for the merged company to obtain sufficient
additional transmission capacity (by improving and upgrading t:.
existing transmission system and/or constructing new capacity)
satisfy all bona fide requests by other utilities for long-terfirm wheeling, as well as its own needs. The five-year limit
171/ "Firm" can include off-peak service, as well as service
that has some degree of interruptibility.
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would begin on the date of each request, although the merged
company would be required to use due diligence to provide the
service sooner than five years, whenever possible.
Following the five-year period transition period, discussed
above, the merged company^ obligation to serve shall include a
requirement that the merged company reduce its own off-system
transactions 172/ to the extent necessary to meet all requests
for transmission service by electric utilities.
Any entity whose request is not met with due diligence (or,
in any event, after five years) may institute a complaint
proceeding before the Commission. A complainant must show that:
(1) it made a request for service that has not been met; (2) it
was willing to pay the full cost of the service; and (3) it has
proffered sufficient security such that the merged company would
not be at financial risk due to non-performance by the requesting
party. Notice of the complaint will be published in the Federal
Register, and others claiming that their requests have not been
met will be permitted to have their complaint consolidated with
the original proceeding.
If a complaint is filed less than five years from the date
of a request for transmission service, the complainant must also
show that the merged company could have provided the service had
the merged company used due diligence. If a complaint is filed
five years or more from the date of the request, no showing with
regard to due diligence will be required. Similarly, a showing
of due diligence on the part of the merged company would not
constitute a defense in such a case. However, no complaint
regarding the long-term service obligation will be entertained
during the five-year transition period. 173/
If a complainant shows that the merged company has failed to
meet its service obligation, as set forth above, the merged
company will be required to reduce its use of transmission
capacity for off-system transactions to the extent necessary to
172/ Off-system purchases of power needed to provide
capacity to the merged company's native load customers,
(including captive wholesale customers) are not subject
to this provision. The merged company may include
five-year projections for native load growth during the
term of the request. Customers under firm contracts
entered into prior to the merger agreement are also not
subject to this provision.
173/ Complaints regarding access to existing capacity during
the transition period, described in section 4(b)(i)
above, will be permitted at any time.
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meet all requests for firm transmission service that have been
shown to be unsatisfied•
Any agreement regarding the transmission capacity obtained
through the merged company^ obligation to serve shall not
contain any provision restraining whatever rights exist under the
FPA to re-assign that capacity. If transmission capacity is
rosold to the merged company, to the extent that it is not needed
to serve native load it must be made available to meet its
obligation to serve other firm wholesale transmission requests.

iii.

N9n-fipt whg»Unq

To the extent that the merged company negotiates non-firm
wheeling transactions with other utilities, rates for such
service shall be based on an equal three-way sharing of the
benefits in accordance with trial staff's revised wheeling
policy. Each party to this rate shall agree to make available to
the other parties such incremental cost information as is
reasonably necessary to estimate the total savings to be shared.
c.

Compliance Filing

As part of its compliance filing, the merged company shall
file as a tariff each of conditions set forth above.
D.

The Effect on Regulation

One of the issues set for hearing was the potential for
impairment of effective regulation. The administrative law judge
found that both the size of the merged entity as well as the
number of states in which it would be operating would create very
difficult interjurisdictional problems. The judge also found
that there would be "serious difficulties inherent in developing
and implementing cost allocation principles for inter-divisional
cost allocations." 174/
While admitting that the merger may potentially create some
additional regulatory burden, the Applicants except to the
finding that the merger would impair effective regulation. 175/
Both the Utah Division of Public Utilities and the Public Service
Commission of Wyoming strongly except to the Initial Decision and
urge this Commission to recognize the ability of the seven
affected states to effectively regulate the multi-jurisdictional
activities of Pacificorp Oregon. Trial staff argues that it
would be possible to effectively regulate the merged entity
174/ 43 FERC at 65,348.
175/ Applicants Brief on Exceptions at 83-85.
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through appropriate rate conditions. 176/ We agree, and find
that appropriate conditions exist which, if accepted by the
Applicants, would enable this Commission and the state
commissions to effectively regulate the merged entity. These
conditions are discussed below in the section on the effect on
rates and operating costs.
The proposed merger would affect Commission jurisdiction in
two principal ways. 177/ First, because the merged entity would
be incorporated in the State of Oregon, this Commission would not
regulate its securities issuances. 178/ That regulatory function
would vest in the Oregon Commission. 179/ Second, and more
importantly for purposes of our consideration, PP&L and UP&L
would cease to be separate legal or jurisdictional entities.
Because of the divisional structure that Pacificorp has elected
to pursue, the jurisdictional public utility would be the merged
company — not the operating divisions. As noted in the
testimony of staff witness, Jonathan L. Siems:
After the merger, it appears that the pricing
of power transfer transactions between the
two companies — which would become two
"divisions" of one company — may no longer
be directly governed by existing FERC rate
schedules, because such transactions
technically will be internal to the merged
company. 180/
While this Commission would continue to regulate the wholesale
rates of Pacificorp Oregon, intra-company transactions by and
176/ Trial Staff Brief on Exceptions, pp. 13-25.
177/ We note that the merger application has been approved
by each of the seven states in which Pacificorp Oregon
would be conducting business. The state commissions
have attached various allocation and rate conditions to
their approval. These include the Applicants'
agreement not to seek retail rate increases for a
certain period of time following the merger, and their
agreement to reduce certain retail rates. The Utah
Public Service Commission, while having approved the
merger, has not yet issued an order explaining its
rationale or describing any conditions it may attach to
its approval.
178/ 16 U.S.C. § 824c(f) (1982).
179/ See Exhibit 3 at 20.
180

Ex. 102 at 8.
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between the two divisions would no longer be "sales for resale11
and therefore will not be subject to a rate schedule or tariff on
file with this Commission. 181/
In its Brief on Exceptions, the Utah Division of Public
Utilities characterizes the proposed divisional organization as
maintaining the current Federal/state regulatory
relationship. 182/ However, pre-merger, Commission
determinations regarding rates for transactions between UP&L and
PP&L would preempt contrary state determinations. 183/ Following
the merger, wholesale rate determinations by this Commission
based upon a particular assignment or allocation of costs between
the two divisions would not preempt a state retail rate
determination based upon a contrary assignment or allocation.
The seven affected states would be free to adopt different (and
potentially inconsistent) cost allocation schemes. As correctly
noted by the Utah Division of Public Utilities:
[A] risk exists that jurisdictions may
allocate costs on a different basis, and that
100 percent of the costs may not be
recovered. . . . Each jurisdiction will have
the right to allocate costs, and the utility
will continue to have a risk that assets will
go unrecovered. 184/
We find this to be a risk that the Applicants have knowingly
assumed in proposing a divisional operating structure and we do
not perceive the possibility that Pacificorp Oregon may underrecover its costs in retail proceedings as impairing the
effectiveness of Federal regulation.
Our concern as a regulatory body is that Pacificorp Oregon
not be permitted to use its proposed divisional structure as a
mechanism for over-recovery of wholesale costs. Consequently, we
intend to preserve the Applicants1 obligation in future rate
cases to give full and complete access to the books and records
181/ 16 U.S.C. 824(d) (1982). We note that if Pacificorp had
chosen to reorganize as a holding company and retained PP&L
and UP&L as operating subsidiaries, PP&L and UP&L would have
remained jurisdictional entities and transactions between
the two operating subsidiaries would have remained
jurisdictional before this Commission.
182/ Utah Division of Public Utilities Brief on Exceptions at 13.
183/ Nantahala Power & Light Company v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953
(1986).
184/ Utah Division of Public Utilities Brief on Exceptions at 19.
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of each of its divisions. Furthermore, we will order Pacificorp
Oregon to maintain a clearly
defined audit trail for
transactions
between divisions.
The judge found that:
Regulators will virtually be at the mercy of
the merged company in determining intercompany cost allocations and thus in
measuring earnings levels and determining
rates. (Ex. 296 at 3). Moreover,
Applicants1 offered "audit trails11 will not
solve these problems. Contrary to the
suggestion of Applicants, audit trails might
permit the unraveling of the merged company's
preferred allocation method, but they will
not necessarily allow the use of alternative
methods preferred by state or federal
regulators. Adequate records might simply be
unavailable to implement any such alternative
methodology. 185/
We disagree. Ultimately, state and Federal regulatory
commissions have to approve the rates that Pacificorp can charge,
respectively, to retail and wholesale ratepayers. To the extent
that Pacificorp1s proposed allocation methodology is unsupported,
flawed, or otherwise unacceptable, this Commission may deny the
recovery of costs. Therefore, failure to maintain and provide an
adequate audit trail for this Commission to "unravel"
intracompany allocations would put the merged entity at further
risk of recovering less than 100 percent of its costs of
providing service. We believe this is an adequate safeguard
against Pacificorp Oregon submitting less than complete cost of
service data to support interdivisional allocations of costs and
revenues.
Finally, as noted above, section 203(b) provides that "the
Commission may from time to time for good cause shown make such
orders supplemental to any order made under this section as it
may find necessary or appropriate.11 186/
Thus, we view our
conditioning authority under section 203(b) as continuing in
nature. Therefore, should an interested party come before the
Commission in the future with a showing that the merged entity
operating in such a manner as to impair the effectiveness of
regulation, or if the Commission svi^ sponte reached this
conclusion, we retain the statutory authority to further
155/ 43 FERC at 65,350-51.
186/ 16 U.S.C. § 824b(b) (1982).
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condition the merger so as to render it consistent with the
public interest,
E.

The Effect on Operating Costs and Rate Levels

In Commonwealth Edison, the Commission stated:
[I]t is our responsibility under the Federal
Power Act in determining whether a merger is
consistent with the public interest to
consider what effect the fact of merger would
have on rate levels or on state regulation of
retail rate design. 187/
Thus, in our order setting the merger application for hearing, we
required that the Applicants submit:
data comparing the operating costs of each
company, as well as whether the Applicants
intend to file future wholesale rates on a
consolidated or divisional basis. 188/
The presiding judge faulted the Applicants for providing
inadequate cost support to enable the Commission to properly
compare the operating costs of each company before the merger
with the operating costs of the combined entity after the merger.
In so doing, the judge misconstrued the nature of our inquiry
with regard to rates under section 203 vis a vis that conducted
in the course of proceedings under sections 205 and 206.
Under section 203, our focus with regard to rates is upon
whether the proposed combination is "likely to effect unnecessary
rate increases or inhibit possible rate reductions.11 190/ In
setting the merger application for hearing, it was not our
intention to require comprehensive cost of service documentation
or to develop wholesale rates in the context of a proceeding
under section 203. Instead, we anticipated a more generalized
inquiry and cross-examination regarding the types of savings and
efficiencies that might be achieved through merger. In the event
that the merger application were to be finally consummated, a
rate proceeding under section 205 may then be held to determine
187/ 36 FPC at 938.
188/ 41 FERC at 61,754.
189/ 43 FERC at 65,334.
190/ 36 FPC at 933, citing Western Massachusetts Electric Co., 2
FPC 345 (1942), and Northwestern Electric Co., 5 FPC 312
(1946).
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just and reasonable rates for the provision of wholesale electric
service by the newly-merged entity. As we will discuss more
fully below, given the magnitude of merger-related cost savings
projected by the Applicants, we intend to establish rate
procedures to ensure that the merger-related savings are
translated into lower wholesale rates as quickly as possible.
We recognize that deferring the actual determination of
wholesale rate levels to a subsequent rate proceeding injects a
degree of uncertainty into the merger approval process. That
uncertainty stems from the fact that the outcome of a rate
proceeding may affect the desirability of the merger — from the
perspective of the Applicants as well as other affected parties.
In our view, some uncertainty is unavoidable if we are to deal
with merger applications in a timely and efficient manner. We
recognize that it would be impossible to anticipate every
possible rate question that may occur as a result of this merger.
However, to the extent possible, we will provide direction and
guidance regarding the likely disposition of identifiable rate
issues that may result from the merger (e.g.. divisional pricing
versus single system or rolled-in pricing) as well as a workable
framework for the administration of future rate proceedings.
1.

Merger Benefits

The Initial Decision discusses the effect on operating costs
and rate levels from the standpoint of the savings or merger
benefits cited by the Applicants in support of the proposed
merger. We find that in rejecting most of the Applicants1
claimed merger benefits, the judge's standard of review was
overly rigid. He concluded that:
• . • the evidence demonstrates that nearly
all of the possible benefits indicated by
Applicants are either speculative, attainable
absent the merger, or pecuniary benefits
(i.e. gained by Applicants at the expense of
others such that the public interest is not
affected). 191/
This conclusion should be viewed, however, in the context of
the judge1s finding that the Commission lacks the authority to
condition the merger in such a manner sufficient to alleviate the
likely anticompetitive effects. Since we are imposing conditions
designed to restrain the merged company's market power and avoid
anticompetitive effects that may result from the merger, the
claimed benefits should be evaluated in the context of those
restraints.

191/ 43 FERC
Digitizedat
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In evaluating the effect of the merger on operating costs
and rate levels, it is necessary to consider all of the benefits
(and costs) likely to result. The possibility of achieving a
particular benefit through a contractual arrangement does noc
diminish the cost savings associated with that benefit. The
relevant question is whether the benefits of a merger will
outweigh its costs such that the current and future cost of
providing electric service will be less.
The Applicants have projected merger-related savings of
approximately $48 million in 1988 increasing to $158 million in
1992. They estimate that total benefits for the five-year period
following the merger will exceed $505 million. 192/ Even if we
discount certain claims by the Applicants that appear overly
speculative or extend too far into the future to be meaningful,
we are still left with substantial savings that may be achieved
as a result of merger. The Applicants have projected that
significant cost reductions will flow from the elimination or
consolidation of duplicative functions when the two companies are
combined. 193/ More importantly, in the area of power supply
costs the Applicants project that considerable savings are
possible due to the diversity in peak demands on the two systems.
Because the UP&L system peaks in summer and the PP&L system peaks
in the winter, the combined system can be dispatched more
efficiently and reserve requirements for the combined entity will
be reduced. 194/ The Applicants estimate that the reduced
capacity requirements will enable Pacificorp Oregon to defer
construction of new capacity until approximately 1997 or
1998. 195/ Furthermore, the merger will provide a better mix of
generating resources and power supply options which will enable
Pacificorp Oregon to take advantage of fuel cost diversities and
to displace higher cost purchased power expenses. 196/
We agree with various intervenors that a major portion
the savings claimed from combining administrative functions
not been substantiated. 197/ However, we are convinced, as
staff argues, that the probable merger benefits nonetheless

of
have
trial
add

192/ Ex. 4, Sch. 3.
193/ Ex. 3 at 10-11.
194/ Ex. 8 at 19-20; Ex. 9, Schs. 13 and 14; and Ex. 10 at 4-16.
195/ Ex. 8 at 20-28 and Ex. 9, Schs. 16, 17, and 21.
196/ Ex. 3 at 9; Ex. 8 at 13; and Ex. 9, Schs. 5-9.
197/ See, e.g., Nucor Steel Brief Opposing Exceptions at 4245.
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up to substantially more than the costs of the merger. 198/ We
further agree that the power supply benefits alone would likely
be greater than the costs of the merger. 199/

2. single gystem punnq
Following the merger, the Applicants have proposed to
design separate rates for the UP&L Division and the PP&L
Division. The Applicants have specifically requested that the
Commission endorse divisional pricing in the present order "at
least for a reasonable period of time during which the costs of
the two divisions will tend to converge." 200/
However, as correctly noted by trial staff and certain
intervenors, Commission precedent clearly supports single system
pricing except in certain limited situations. 201/ As Sierra
Pacific and Nevada Power Company point out:
The principal reason behind adoption of
[rolled-in costing] is that an integrated
system is designed to achieve maximum
efficiency and reliability at a minimum cost
on a system wide basis. Implicit in this
theory is the assumption that all customers
. . . receive the benefits that are inherent
in such an integrated system. 202/
For purposes of wholesale ratemaking, the presumption is that
single system pricing is appropriate unless the utility can
demonstrate a valid basis for departing from that presumption.
We note further that single system pricing would solve many of
the problems identified by the judge with regard to the
Applicants' divisional pricing proposal. 203/

198/ Trial staff Brief on Exceptions at 12.
199/ !&•
200/ Applicants Brief on Exceptions at 71.
201/ See, e.g.. Trial staff Brief on Exceptions at 22,
citing Sierra Pacific Power Co. v. FERC, 793 F.2d 1086
(9th Cir. 1986) ; Sierra Pacific and Nevada Power
Company Brief Opposing Exceptions at 11-12.
202/ Sierra Pacific and Nevada Power Company Brief Opposing
Exceptions at 12, quoting Otter Tail Power Co., Opinion
No. 93, 12 FERC J 61,169 at 61,420 (1980).
203/ Trial Staff Brief on Exceptions at 22.
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Obviously, when a merger is proposed between utilities with
disparate costs, single system pricing may work to the advantage
of ratepayers of one utility and to the disadvantage of
ratepayers of the other utility. In evaluating whether a
proposed merger is consistent with the public interest, the
Commission's focus must be upon the overall or net impact upon
rates. To insist upon immediate single system pricing might
discourage certain mergers where efficiency gains are possible,
thereby depriving ratepayers of substantial savings.
Furthermore, there may be other valid reasons to allow some
flexibility for purposes of pricing generation and transmission
service (e.g., to more accurately reflect regional differences in
the cost of production). Therefore, the Commission is willing to
countenance an initial level of rate disparity between divisions
to permit Pacificorp Oregon to gain some experience operating as
a merged entity, to ameliorate possible rate shock to existing
wholesale PP&L ratepayers, and to allow the system time to become
more fully integrated.
In support of the merger, the Applicants have stated that
Pacificorp Oregon will be operated as a single integrated system.
After the merger, the companies1 generation
and transmission resources will be planned
and operated on a single-utility basis (Ex.
8, pp. 28-30; Ex. 207, p. 45). The merger
•will create an even more integrated system
than before,• which will be fully integrated,
and fwill operate in an interconnected and
coordinated fashion1 (Ex. 8, p. 30). The
consolidation will allow the Merged Company
to dispatch its most economic generating
units (Ex. 8, p. 31). 204/
Furthermore, the Applicants have stated that Pacificorp Oregon
will move naturally towards single system pricing within the next
fifteen to twenty years. 205/ However, we can find no evidence
in the record that would support fifteen to twenty years as a
reasonable period of time to phase in single system pricing. 2_c-l
Indeed, the only basis cited by Applicants in support of their
204/ Applicants Initial Brief at 7.
205/ Tr. 1366, 1369.
206/ Note that the term "phase-in" does not connote any deferr
revenue recovery and does not involve FASB 92 considerate:
regarding the appropriate phase-in period. See Arkansas
Power & Light Company, 41 FERC f 61,034 (1987) and Notice
Inquiry, Accounting for Phase-In Plans, 53 Fed. Reg. 2*,
(1988) .
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proposed divisional pricing concept is that "uniform prices would
result in substantial price increases for Pacific customers,
perhaps in the order of 15 to 20%." 207/ We are unwilling to
adopt a particular phase-in period based upon the record
developed in a proceeding under section 203. Consequently, we
will order Pacificorp Oregon to phase in single system pricing
and set the determination of a reasonable phase-in period for
hearing as part of the first rate proceeding ordered following
the merger.
We wish #to stress that allowing divisional pricing for
Pacificorp Oregon is an exception to our general policy of
requiring rolled-in pricing of generation and transmission and we
are in no way overruling that general policy. Our approval of
the proposed merger is not intended to encourage divisional
reorganizations of existing utilities in order to assign specific
generation or transmission resources to specific customers.
Our willingness to accept divisional pricing for a limited period
of time is expressly contingent upon Pacificorp Oregon submitting
detailed cost support for the allocation of costs and revenues
between the two divisions in the upcoming rate proceedings as
ordered below.
3.

Interiurisdictional/Interdivisional Allocation
Process

As noted by the presiding judge, the consensus process
proposed by Applicants to implement interdivisional and
interjurisdictional cost allocations is seriously flawed. The
Applicants have admitted that "interjurisdictional and
intercompany allocations are among the most complex and
controversial areas of utility regulation," and it "may well take
several years of discussions and actual experience before all
affected parties understand the issues involved and consensus
emerges regarding appropriate cost allocation for the

2 07/ Applicants Brief Opposing Exceptions at 15. As proof of
this statement, the Applicants derived rates for each
division as well as for the combined post-merger entity by
dividing calendar year 1987 revenues by calendar year 1987
MWH sales. fid., Appendix A.) However, this is not
enlightening because it assumes that the revenues of the
combined single entity will be equal to the sum of the
revenues collected by UP&L and PP&L before the merger. In
light of the substantial cost savings the Applicants have
proffered in support of the merger application, there is no
reason to assume that either revenues or sales from 1937
accurately reflect what revenue or sales figures will be fc:
the merged entity.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Docket No. EC88-2-000

-56-

consolidated entity." 208/ While we are sympathetic to the
Applicants' desire for uniformity and consistency between the
various jurisdictions, we cannot allow the consensus process to
delay the implementation of lower wholesale rates that fully
reflect the benefits of the merger. The Applicants have stated
that:
The objective is to ensure, as we have with
our existing allocation system, that there is
an opportunity for 100 percent cost
collection, and the objective here would be
that we are not giving away more than 100
percent of the merger benefits. 209/
In that regard, we note that the Applicants have failed to
establish that the selective rate reductions and moratoriums
offered before the various state public utility commissions and
at this Commission bear any relationship to the ultimate cost the
merged entity will incur to provide electric service. We have no
way of knowing if PP&L's current wholesale rates will be costjustified after the merger nor do we have any indication that the
cost of providing service to UP&L customers will decrease by two
percent after the merger. At best, we can accept the (premerger) rates that Pacificorp Oregon proposes to charge its
wholesale customers on a temporary or interim basis following the
merger. This will provide the newly-merged entity time to fully
prepare cost-of-service studies to support just and reasonable
wholesale rates.
4.

FuelftfljygtmentCjau?e

Initially, it will be necessary for the new jurisdictional
entity, Pacificorp Oregon, to file a Notice of Succession in
accordance with the Commission's regulations in order to take
over operating control of the jurisdictional facilities of UP&L
and PP&L — including all rate schedules that are currently on
file. 210/ As noted by Sierra Pacific, when Pacificorp Oregon,
as the new jurisdictional entity, adopts UP&L's existing fuel
adjustment clause, the fuel clause by its own terms can no longer
reflect the fuel costs and Kilowatthour sales of UP&L, but must
reflect the total fuel costs and total kilowatthour sales of
Pacificorp Oregon.
Consistent with Section 35.14 of the
Commission's regulations, UP&L's rate
208/ Ex. 3 at 18; Tr. 1276.
209/ Tr. 1185.
2,10/ 18 C.F.R. § 35.16 (1988)
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schedule provides fuel costs to be calculated
based on the fuel consumed within the
"utility's own plants". After the merger,
generation plants will no longer be owned by
UP&L and PP&L, but will be owned by the
merged corporation, Pacificorp. Tr. 1335.
Hence, per Commission regulations, Pacificorp
must pass through fuel costs of its
generation. This interpretation of
Commission regulations is fully consistent
with Commission decisions regulating gas
utilities in which the Commission has
directed merged companies to calculate gas
costs as the combined or rolled-in costs of
the two formerly separate companies. fCitina
Consolidated Natural Gas SUPDIV Corp.,
Opinion No. 703, 52 FPC 454 (1974) and
National Fuel Gas Supply Corp., 7 FERC
1 61,317 (1979).] For the same reasons, the
purchased power costs flowed through the
fuel-clause should be calculated on a single
system basis. 211/
Accordingly, from the date the Notice of Succession is accepted
by the Commission, UP&L's current fuel adjustment clause must
operate on a total company basis. This will fully protect UP&L's
existing wholesale ratepayers from possible overcharges, is
consistent with the Commission's fuel clause regulations, and
will defer allocation questions until the first full rate
proceeding ordered following the merger. As part of that
proceeding, Pacificorp Oregon is free to propose the elimination
of the fuel adjustment clause and the collection of fuel costs
through separate base energy rates for each division.
5.

F9fupd| Liability

where a corporate reorganization or merger generates
significant cost savings, there is very little incentive for the
new utility to come forward with new rates that fully reflect
those savings. Under the Commission's regulations, if the merger
is approved the surviving entity would be required to file a
Notice of Succession pursuant to 18 C.F.R. § 35.16 (1988). At
that time, the surviving entity could either seek to continue the
existing rates or could file a rate change application
simultaneously with its notice of succession. 212/ In either
211/ Sierra Pacific and Nevada Power Company Initial Brief at :
212/ However, if a rate decrease were filed, under section
205 of the FPA there is no statutory refund obligation.
(continued...)
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event, the Commission cannot make a finding under section 203
that the merger is consistent with the public interest without
some assurance that the post-merger wholesale rates will not be
excessive. 213/ In the absence of such assurance, the Commission
would be in the anomalous situation of approving a merger that
could result in the collection of substantial excess revenues
without according any refund protection to the affected wholesale
customers. We agree with the observation by Sierra Pacific
witness Smith:
[A] commitment to a rate filing without
refund floor is required, otherwise the
effective date of reduced rate levels that
properly reflect the cost to serve . . .
wholesale customers as of the date of the
merger could be delayed unjustifiably for a
substantial period of time. 214/
Therefore, as we will describe more fully below, we intend
to condition our approval of the merger under section 203 upon
Pacificorp Oregon making three separate section 205 rate change
applications to ensure that the cost savings that have been
projected in support of the merger are fully reflected in
wholesale rates. The burden of proof in these applications shall
be upon Pacificorp Oregon. Furthermore, under the rate
procedures we intend to establish, Pacificorp Oregon will be
obligated to make refunds, back to the effective date of each of
the three rate change applications, that reflect the rate level
ultimately determined to be just and reasonable.
6.

Rate Conditions

212/(...continued)
16 U.S.C. § 824d(e) (1982). Should it ultimately be
determined that the proposed rates are unjust and
unreasonable, a new rate can only be imposed
prospectively. after the Commission establishes the
just and reasonable rate to be thereafter observed.
213/ In a period of declining costs, it is to the utility's
advantage to understate cost savings and overstate
proposed rates (or to make no rate change application
at all and wait until a complaint proceeding is filed
under section 206 of the FPA). However, we note that
the recently enacted Regulatory Fairness Act, Pub. L.
No. 100-473 (1988), provides some refund protection
where rates are found to be unjust and unreasonable.
214/ Ex. 298 at 5.
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In their Initial Brief, the Applicants have included a
number of conditions 115/ which relate to the effect of the
merger on rates. With respect to the UP&L Division, the
Applicants have agreed to reduce wholesale rates by two percent
and to freeze the fuel adjustment clause at 13 mills, subject to
refund. The Applicants have also agreed to file a cost-ofservice study for UP&L Division requirements service equivalent
to Statement BK 216/ within nine months of the effective date of
the merger, and annually thereafter upon the request of the
Commission. And, within one year, the Applicants are willing to
file a cost-of-service study for UP&L Division wheeling service.
We note that these various cost-of-service filings are
informational only. That is, the merged company will not file
for a decrease in rates (beyond the initial two percent
reduction) until after the informational filing is processed and
a determination is made that a rate decrease is justified. The
Applicants claim that:
[a] full rate filing is necessarily a major
undertaking under 18 C.F.R. § 35.13 and
should be required only if a cost of service
shows a rate decrease to be justified. 217/
With regard to the PP&L Division, the Applicants have
undertaken a general commitment not to increase wholesale rates
until 1992. The Applicants do not intend to make any filing to
support the continuation of PP&Lfs current wholesale rates. 213/
Trial staff has suggested a procedure under which the
Commission would (1) accept the Applicants1 offer to cap the
wholesale rates of the PP&L Division until April 1992, 219/
(2) require a complete rate case filing by the UP&L Division for
both wholesale requirements service as well as wheeling service
within six months after the merger is approved, and annually
215/ These conditions have been proposed by the Applicants
"without conceding either the authority of the Commission t
impose such conditions or the adequacy of the record to
justify such conditions." Applicants Initial Brief,
Appendix B.
216/ 18 C.F.R. § 35.13(h)(36) (1988).
217/ Applicants Reply Brief at 15-16.
218/ Id. at 18.
219/ The Applicants assert that PP&Lfs rates are already cappo:.
However, the presiding judge correctly found that only or
of PP&L's five wholesale rates currently on file is capp:;.
43 FERC at 65,356.
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thereafter until 1992, (3) require a concurrent informational
filing by the PP4L Division, and (4) require the UPiL Division to
submit a 2% base rate reduction and propose an interim FAC
allocation procedure within 30 days after the merger is approved. 2_2
Trial staff also endorsed a proposal by Sierra Pacific witness
Smith that the first rate filing by the UP&L Division be made
without a refund floor.
We have a number of concerns regarding the Applicants1
unsupported offer to reduce certain wholesale customers1 rates by
two percent and to freeze the rates of other wholesale customers
at their current levels for several years. We are particularly
concerned that the various informational filings proposed by the
Applicants that are "similar in format" to the cost support
required in a formal rate application, but which will precede
such rate applications, are merely devices that will
unnecessarily delay implementation of lower wholesale rates. And
while we support the general thrust of trial staff!s proposed
rate procedures, we feel that a number of modifications are
necessary to ensure that the merger savings projected by the
Applicants are translated into lower wholesale rates as quickly
as possible. Accordingly, we are making our approval of the
merger expressly contingent upon the filing of three distinct
rate applications by Pacificorp Oregon.
The first filing shall be made no later than June 1, 1989,
and shall include:
1) functionalized test period cost of service information
on a total company basis and development of a single system
requirements rate and a single system firm wheeling rate;
2) explanation and cost support (including all workpapers)
for the allocation of total company revenues and expenses to
the UPiL Division and the PP&L Division;
3) A UP&L Division rate filing in accordance with 13 C.F.R.
S 35.13 including full Period I and Period II cost of
service statements to support proposed requirements rates
and proposed firm wheeling rates to become effective on June
1, 1989;
4) A PP&L Division rate filing in accordance with 18 C.F.R.
§ 35.13 including Period I and Period II cost of service
statements to support proposed requirements rates and

220/ Trial staff Initial Brief at 54-74; Trial staff Reply
Brief at 13-20.
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proposed firm wheeling rates to become effective on June 1,
1989; 221/
5) A proposal to either (a) continue the single system fuel
adjustment clause (effective upon Pacificorp Oregon's
succession to UP&L's rate schedules) and extend its
applicability to the PP&L Division wholesale customers or
(b) eliminate the fuel adjustment clause altogether i.e..
build all such costs into base rates; and
6) A plan for phasing out divisional pricing over a
reasonable period of time.
Pacificorp Oregon shall utilize the same test periods for all of
the filings discussed above. We recognize that this type of
simultaneous cost of service presentation will involve a
substantial filing burden for the new company. However, we feel
that this process is necessary for the Commission to
intelligently evaluate the inter-divisional cost allocation
process and will help ensure that Pacificorp neither underrecovers nor over-recovers the cost of providing wholesale
service.
The total company filing will provide a "shadow rate" which
will enable the Commission to track the difference between
divisional pricing and single system pricing, to identify the
degree to which one division may be "subsidizing" the operations
of the other division, and to evaluate the reasonableness of the
time period proposed to phase in single system pricing. A single
system rate will also provide a good benchmark against which
retail jurisdictions may evaluate retail rate proposals by the
merged entity. We wish to stress, however, that any allocation
methodology that is adopted by the Commission for allocating
costs between the two divisions will be without prejudice to
contrary allocations or assignments of cost by retail regulatory
commissions.
The second filing shall be made so as to become effective,
subject to refund, on June 1, 1991. It shall be similar in
format to the filing described above and shall include the
development of a single system rate for comparison purposes, a
UP&L Division rate change application, and a PP&L Division rate
change application. Again, the same test period must be used to
support each application as well as the single system comparison
rate.
2 21/ Pacificorp Oregon may propose rates for either division that
are designed to recover less than the fully allocated cost
of service. This will enable Pacificorp Oregon to "freeze'1
PP&L rates at their current level so long as those rates car.
be cost-justified.
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The third filing shall be made so as to become effective,
subject to refund, on June 1, 1993. It is hoped that the merged
entity will be fully integrated by this date and that the
proposed rate will be a single system rate. However, if
divisional pricing is to be continued beyond June 1# 1993, this
filing shall be in the same format required for the first two
filings. Pacificorp Oregon is free to make other rate change
applications within the first five years of merged operations,
but we will require any such filings to be made for both
divisions simultaneously.
All divisional rate applications filed by Pacificorp Oregon
within the first five years after the merger shall be made under
section 205. Pacificorp Oregon must refund the difference
between the rate that is accepted for filing and the rate that is
ultimately determined to be just and reasonable back to the
effective date of each rate application filed within the first
five years after the merger. Our intention is to ensure, to the
extent possible, that the cost of service filings fully reflect
the benefits and cost savings that the Applicants have projected
for the first five years of merged operations. Refund
obligations associated with any rate filings made after June 1,
1993 shall be in accordance with Commission regulations in effect
at that time. However, so long as Pacificorp Oregon proposes
divisional pricing, rate applications for each division shall be
made simultaneously and shall be based upon the same twelve-month
test period.
We find that absent such rate conditions, the instant merger
would not be consistent with the public interest. We again note
our ability to subsequently condition the merger, if necessary.
F.

Noncontiguous Systems

CREDA argues that the proposed merger must be rejected as
contrary to the general public policy against mergers of
noninterconnected and noncontiguous systems. 222/ Citing
Commonwealth and Western Light & Telephone. Co. (Western Light),
CREDA argues that Commission precedent requires merging utilities
to either interconnect or divest themselves of any noncontiguous
portions of their systems. Thus, CREDA asserts that unless the
Commission overrules its precedent on this subject, the
Commission would at a minimum have to condition approval of this
merger on a showing that Pacificorp Oregon will either: (1)
interconnect its Western System with its Eastern system and/or
the UP&L system; or (2) divest the PP&L western system.
222/ CREDA Brief Opposing Exceptions at 77.
223/ 33 FPC 1147 (1965).
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The cases cited by CREDA rely on the fact that the Federal
Power Act (containing section 203) was enacted together with
PUHCA as a single legislative bill. PUHCA prohibits mergers or
acquisitions by holding companies that do not tend toward the
economical and efficient development of an integrated public
utility system. Z2A/ Citing the above legislative history and
Western Light, the Commission stated in Commonwealth:
[W]e believe that the basic congressional
policies as to integrated operation embedded
in [PUHCA] are applicable considerations in
passing upon proposals for merger of
operating companies, and that the burden is
upon the applicants to demonstrate why
operation of noncontiguous electric
territories or combined gas and electric
facilities is consistent with the public
interest. 225/
For the reasons set forth below# we overrule Commonwealth
and Western Light to the extent that they may be interpreted as
requiring the parties to a merger to either physically
interconnect their noncontiguous systems or to divest themselves
of those systems. The requirements of PUHCA, including the
prohibition against mergers that do not meet the definition of an
integrated public utility system, apply only to public utility
holding companies. Neither CREDA, nor the Commission in
Commonwealth and Western adequately distinguish between operating
electric utilities that are part of a holding company system and
those that are not. This distinction is a crucial one, for it
was the holding company •device1 that was the target of PUHCA.
PUHCA was enacted in 1935 in response to widespread abuses
among utility holding companies. 2267 These abuses resulted in
224/ 15 U.S.C. § 79(a)(29)(A) (1982).

S£S n. 80, supra.

225/ 36 F.P.C. at 943.
226/ In a message to Congress on March 12, 1935, President
Roosevelt addressed the legislation being considered by
Congress to remedy the abuses of the utility holding
companies. The President stated:
Except where it is absolutely necessary to
the continued functioning of a geographically
integrated operating utility system, the
utility holding company with its present
powers must go. If we could remake our
(continued...)
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the loss of millions of dollars to the investing public. 227/ By
its terms, PUHCA is limited in its application to public-utility
holding companies and their affiliates* The concern that the
226/(...continued)
financial history in light of experience,
certainly we would have none of this holdingcompany business. It is a device which does
not belong to our American traditions of law
and business. . . . [I]t offers too welldemonstrated temptation to and facility for
abuse to be tolerated as a recognized
business institution. That temptation and
that facility are inherent in its very
nature. S. Rep. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. at 3 (1935), (setting forth the text of
the President's message sent to Congress on
March 12, 1935, transmitting a report on
public-utility holding companies prepared by
the National Power Policy Committee).
227/ In a statement to Congress in 1982, the precarious
financial position of the holding companies prior to
the enactment of PUHCA was summarized by the Chairman
of the Securities and Exchange Commission:
As a result of the highly-leveraged capital
structures, small percentage increases in the
earnings of the underlying operating
companies were phenomenally magnified at the
level of the top holding company's most
junior equity securities. . . . Of course,
this leverage also worked in reverse so that
even the relatively small decreases in
earnings of the operating companies during
the early 1930's had a significant impact on
the top-heavy structure of holding company
debt and preferred securities. • • •
The investing public suffered losses of
millions of dollars. The complex capital
structures of these holding company systems,
together with the lack of uniform accounting
standards, also afforded many opportunities
to direct profits cr losses through
intercompany channels. Public Utility
Holding Company Act Amendments, Hearings on
S.1869, S.1871 and S.1977 before the Subcomm.
on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong. 2d
Sess. 369-370 (1982).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Docket No. EC88-2-000

-65-

holding company device be abolished, "except where it is
absolutely necessary to the continued functioning of a
geographically integrated operating utility system11, is embodied
in section 11(b)(1) of PUHCA, 221/ which requires the
simplification of holding company systems by limiting them to a
single integrated public-utility system. Similarly, section
10(c)(2) prohibits mergers or acquisitions with or by a holding
company if such acquisition does not tend toward the economical
and efficient development of an integrated public-utility system. 2_2j
Relying on Commonwealth and Western Light. CREDA insists
that the Commission apply a strict "interconnect or divest" rule
to this merger. Thus, they are arguing that the single
integrated public utility system concept as set forth in PUHCA is
fundamental to our analysis of whether a merger not involving a
holding company is consistent with the public interest pursuant
to section 203 of the FPA. Implicit in this argument is the
assumption that the difference between a holding company system
and an operating company is one of mere formality, and not one of
substance.
However, as noted, PUHCA specifically targeted the holding
company device and the evils attendant thereto. In fact,
Congress recognized a clear distinction between a holding company
and an operating company, and expressly contemplated that various
operating units could be merged into a single operating company
so long as it did not employ the holding company device. "All
the advantages of large-scale operation and centralized financing
claimed for present-day holding companies can be obtained when a
holding company holds a single integrated system of operating
companies or when a number of operating units are merged into the
legal unit of a single large operating company." 220/
Accordingly, we need not determine whether a proposed merger
will result in an "integrated public utility system" as defined
in PUHCA. Similarly, we need not apply a strict rule requiring
either the interconnection or divestiture of noncontiguous
systems. While we recognize that the extent to which the systems
will be integrated is relevant to our inquiry under section 203,
our focus under the FPA is more appropriately upon the merged

228/ 15 U.S.C. § 79k(b)(l) (1982).
2 29/ 15 U.S.C. § 79j(c)(2) (1982).
2 3 0/ S. Rep. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. at 12 (emphasis
added).
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entity's ability to provide economical and reliable service to
the public. 231/
As noted, the FPA was enacted together with PUHCA. While
PUHCA required that holding companies be dismembered and
reconstituted along regional lines, one of the Commission's
responsibilities under the FPA is to oversee the realignment of
electric utility operating companies following the breakup of the
holding companies. 232/ The Senate Report on the Public Utility
Act of 1935 states: "This section [203] • . . complements title
I of the bill [PUHCA] by directing the [Commission] to prevent
transfers or consolidations of property which would impair the
ability of public utilities to render adequate
gervjgg- . . •" 222/
231/ As we stated in the order setting this matter for
hearing, "we will permit the parties to address the
issue of whether the merged companies will be capable
of being operated economically and efficiently as a
single entity. We will also set for hearing the issue
of the impact on the public interest of the merged
entity not operating as a single entity to the extent
such is found to be the case." 41 FERC at 61,755. We
adopted the same approach in the order setting for
hearing the merger application in Tucson Electric Power
CO., it ai.r 44 FERC J 61,441 (1988).
232/ In testimony before Congress, the Commission's
Solicitor - one of the drafters of the legislation that
was to become the Federal Power Act - stated:
[T]he provision . . . with reference to
consolidation is very important when
considered in connection with title I [PUHCA]
of this bill. . . . To have legislation of
this kind enacted at the same time
legislation of the character carried in title
I is enacted is important, because whatever
form title I takes, there is going to be a
realignment in this industry and steps should
be taken now to protect the public against an
uneconomic realignrent. Hearings before the
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
House of Representatives (House Hearings), p.
250 (emphasis added).
233/ S. Report No. 621, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 50 (1935)
(emphasis added). Similarly, the Commission's
Solicitor stated:
(continued... )
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Section 202 of the FPA provides, inter alia, that f,[f]or the
purpose of assuring an abundant supply of electric energy
throughout the United States with the greatest possible economy
and with rejard to the proper utilization and conservation of
natural resources", the Commission is to encourage the voluntary
interconnection and coordination of facilities in the public
interest. 234/ Similarly, the Commission is given the authority
under section 203(b) to grant approval of proposed mergers and
consolidations upon terms and conditions that it finds "necessary
or appropriate to secure the maintenance of adequate service and
the coordination in the public interest of facilities" that are
subject to its jurisdiction.
Thus, it is apparent that the appropriate focus under
section 203 is on whether a proposed merger will impair the
ability of the utility to render adequate service, and on whether
it will result in an uneconomic realignment of electric operating
facilities. The degree to which the merged entity will be
comprised of interconnected and contiguous systems is relevant to
the extent that it bears on the ability of the merged entity to
capture economies of scale and to provide economical and reliable
service. As the Commission recognized in Commonwealth, "[t]he
touchstone of successful operation in todayfs electric power
industry is the coordination of operating facilities to achieve
the full economies of scale made possible by advancing
technology." 23 5/
In this case, the Applicants accept the judge's finding that
PP&Lfs two separate systems (its Western and Eastern systems) are
not physically interconnected and that PP&L relies on contract
rights to operate on a single utility basis. 236/ Similarly,
they acknowledge that UP&L's system is not interconnected with
233/(...continued)
The Commission is given . . . the duty of
attempting to bring these systems into
district and integrated systems, the purpose
being to provide the best and cheapest
service that can be provided for the public.
. . . [I]f that is to be accomplished, then,
this Commission must have certain
jurisdiction over facilities and jurisdiction
over acquisition of property, and
jurisdiction over securities. House
Hearings, p. 501 (emphasis added).
234/ 16 U.S.C. § 824a(a) (1982).
235/ 36 FPC 927, 930 (emphasis added).
236/ Applicants Brief on Exceptions at 81.
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PP&L's Western system; that there is no evidence that such
systems will become physically interconnected after the merger;
and that the merged entity's combined electric systems would
constitute 19 integrated service areas separated by transmission
constraints. 237/ The Applicants argue, however, that these
facts are irrelevant to a determination of whether the merged
company will operate economically and reliably as a single
utility. We disagree, and find that these facts are relevant to
our analysis. However, as discussed below, we nonetheless find
that the merger will enhance the ability of the Applicants to
operate economically and reliably, and will result in an entity
capable of being operated as a single, coordinated system.
Because of the geographic diversity of PP&L's service
territory, operational control of PP&L's present system is
maintained through its two coordinated control areas. 238/
Nonetheless, PP&L operates and plans its generation and
transmission resources on a single coordinated system basis. 239/
After the merger, the merged company's generation and
transmission resources will also be planned and operated on a
single-utility basis, thus permitting it to dispatch its most
economic generating units. 240/
UP&L is presently interconnected to PP&L's Eastern system at
Naughton, Wyoming. "241/ The Applicants plan to ultimately raise
the transfer capacity between UP&L and PP&L to approximately 53 0
MW and to construct other transmission facilities in order to
eliminate transmission limitations east of PP&L's Jim Bridger
plant and to permit access to lower-cost sources of power. 242/
Moreover, PP&L's 1980 Transmission Services Agreement (TSA)
with Idaho Power provides for the transmission of up to 1600 MW
of PP&L's Wyoming generation through Idaho Power's system in an
227/ Id238/ Ex. 8 at 4, 6-7; Tr. at 2035.
239/ Ex. 8 at 4-5.
240/ Ex. 8 at 28-30. The Applicants maintain that the
merger will create an even more integrated system that
will operate in an interconnected and coordinated
fashion. They also suggest that the merger will result
in an integrated public utility system as defined in
PUHCA. However, as discussed above, we need not make
such a determination.
241/ Ex. 9, Sch. 3 at 4.
242/ Ex. 8 at 33-35.
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east to west direction to PP&L's energy deficient Western system.
CREDA argues that these contract rights are not equivalent to
interconnection since the TSA does not permit transfers from west
to east. 243/ However, the merged company will not require such
transfers since Western loads exceed Western generation. 2 44/
While it is conceivable that west to east transfers may become
necessary, the Applicants state that they are willing to
construct a transmission line bypassing Idaho Power's system if
the Commission determines one is necessary.
Thus, we find that the merger will enhance the ability of
UP&L and PP&L to operate economically and reliably, and will
result in an entity capable of being operated as a single,
coordinated system. 245/ We will, however, retain continuing
jurisdiction over the issue of whether it will be necessary at
some time in the future for the Applicants to construct a
transmission line bypassing Idaho Power's system in order to
continue operating economically and reliably as a single,
coordinated system.

243/ CREDA Brief Opposing Exceptions at 78-9. CREDA also
argues that the TSA does not permit transfers of power
from sources other than PP&L's own generation. Id.
However, we find that this does not represent a
significant limitation. Moreover, if it proves to be a
significant limitation in the future, we are retaining
jurisdiction, as discussed below, to order the
Applicants to construct a transmission line to
alleviate this restraint.
244/ Ex. 207 at 47.
245/ The Applicants have indicated that they are willing to
commit that capacity curtailments to interruptible
customers will not increase in frequency or duration
over historical levels, regardless of the merged
company's level of firm, off-system sales. Tr. 268183. While the Applicants are unwilling to make a
similar commitment with regard to economic
curtailments, Tr. 3334, there has been no showing that
an increase in the frequency or duration of such
curtailments is likely to result from the merger, or
that an increase in such curtailments would adversely
affect the overall reliability of the merged company.
We note that interruptible customers will retain
whatever 'contract rights after the merger as existed
before the merger, as well as whatever remedies are
available pursuant to state retail rate regulation.
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The Commission orders:
(A) The Joint Application for Authorization for a Merger
filed October 5, 1987 is hereby granted subject to the terms and
conditions set forth in the body of this order*
(B) Within 60 days of the issuance of this order the
Applicants shall make a compliance filing with the Commission,
ircluding a statement either accepting or rejecting the terms and
conditions set forth above. However, if any request for
rehearing is pending at the expiration of the 60-day period, the
filing shall be made within 15 days of the date the Commission
disposes of the request[s] for rehearing. If within the
aforementioned period no compliance filing has been made,
Commission approval shall be deemed denied.
(C)

Docket No. EC88-2-000 is hereby terminated.

By the Commission.
( S E A L )
Lois D. Cashell,
Secretary.
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REVISED WHEELING POLICY

PROPOSED BY STAFF
Following is the wheeling policy (Policy) of PacifiCorp
(Company), and its operating divisions, Pacific Power 6 Light
Company and Utah Power & Light Company (Utah Power).

I.

PBFIKITIQPS
As used herein, the following terms shall have the following

meanings:
1.

"Embedded Costs19 means the actual fixed and variable

costs associated with transmission facilities calculated in
accordance with established Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) regulations.
2.

"Firm Wheeling19 means the contractual obligation to

stand ready to transmit power and energy up to a specified amount
for a specified term, subject to such interruptions as are agreed
to between the contracting parties to maintain system
reliability.
3.

"Integrated Service Area99 means a geographic area of the

Company's system within which it is generally unconstrained in
its ability to respond to requests to transmit power in the
quantities that can be reasonably expected.
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4.

"Non-Firm Wheeling91 means transmission service that is

interruptible at the sole discretion of the Company, or
interruptible for any reason other than system reliability, as
agreed to between the contracting parties.
5.

"Opportunity Costs19 of a wheeling transaction means the

economic benefits to the Company and its customers of alternative
uses of transmission facilities which must be foregone to- make
the transaction.
6.

"Point of Delivery" means the point at which power

wheeled by the Company is received by another utility.
7.

"Point of Replacement" means the point at which the

Company takes delivery of power to be wheeled for another
utility.
8.

"Source" means the Mona Substation or any facility that

generates electricity that is located within an Integrated
Service Area.
9.

"Transmission Dependent Utilities" means those Utilities

that are dependent on the Company for transmission access to
their loads or resources, and includes Deseret Generation and
Transmission Co-operative, Utah Associated Municipal Power
Systems, Inc. and its present members, and the present members of
the Utah Municipal Power Association.
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10.

"Utility" means any public or private entity that is

lawfully engaged in the business of selling electricity at
wholesale or retail.

II.

EXISTING CPPTRACTS
All transmission contracts to which Utah Power or Pacific

Power 6 Light Company were parties as of the effective date of
this Policy shall be honored by the Company for their remaining
term.

III. FIRM WHKLIWg WTHIM AH INTEGRATED SERVICE AREA
When both the Source and Point of Delivery are within one of
its Integrated Service Areas, the Company will provide Firm
Wheeling service for a requesting Utility as a matter of course
unless the amount of power to be wheeled exceeds the engineering
limitations of the Company's system.
The rate for Firm Wheeling service provided pursuant to this
Part III will be designed to recover an allocated portion of
either system embedded cost or an allocated portion of the
embedded cost of the facilities used to provide the requested
service.

The party requesting service shall not be required to

agree, as a condition for receiving service, to the Company's
method of allocating such costs.
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To ths extant that additions to tha Company's transmission
facilities are necessary to provide Firm Wheeling within an
Integrated Service Area, and are technically feasible, the
Company will construct such additions if sufficient lead time is
provided and a contract term is agreed upon that is adequate to
economically support the facilities required.

IV.

FIRM WHEELING SERVICE INTO, OUT 0Ff OR THROUGH

AW INTEGRATED SERVICE AREA
A.

Determination or Ability to Provide Service.

When either or both the Point of Replacement or Delivery are
not internal to a single Integrated Service Area, the Company
will provide F i n Wheeling service to a requesting Utility unless
the Company determines that provision of the requested service
would impair its ability to render firm service to native load
customers, would preclude its ability to meet obligations under
previously executed wheeling and bulk power contracts, or would
otherwise be impractical or impermissible for reasons beyond the
Company's control.

This determination will be based upon a

reasonable, case-specific evaluation of the following factors
only:
1.

The duration of the requested service;

2.

Whether new facilities would have to be constructed ir.
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order to provide the requested service over the
Company's facilities;
3.

Whether other Utilities desire the same transmission
services;

4.

Whether the provisions of transmission contracts with
other Utilities permit the requested service;

5.

Whether the intentions of the Utility requesting
service are lawful (for example would there be a
violation of laws related to a certificated area);

6.

The degree of firmness of the requested service;

7.

The service priority of the requested service;

8.

The system impacts of the requested service;

9.

To the extent the requested service involves the
control area of another Utility, whether that other
Utility will cooperate in providing the service;

10.

Whether the Utility requesting the service is a
scheduling Utility;

11.

Current laws and regulations as they apply to the
Company and its competitors.

B.

Rates for Service.

The rates for Firm Wheeling service provided pursuant to
Paragraph IV.A. will be designed to recover an allocated portion
of embedded system costs, together with Opportunity Costs, if
any, incurred as a result of providing the service.
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Opportunity Cost rate component will be based upon the following
principles:
1.

The Company may base its quantification of Opportunity
Costs on the incremental changes to the Company*s costs
and revenues caused by commitment of Company
transmission facilities to the provision of Firm
Wheeling service.

2.

The Company's quantification of Opportunity Costs will
not include lost benefits associated with the loss of
the sale of firm power by the Company that is displaced
by the power being transferred pursuant to this Policy.

3.

The amount by which the Opportunity Cost based rate
exceeds the underlying Embedded Cost based rate shall
not exceed the unit cost of eliminating the
transmission capacity constraint or constraints giving
rise to the Opportunity Costs, giving due regard to the
estimated present value of costs and revenues
associated with such additional capacity.

As part of

this rate development process, the Company will examine
the technical feasibility and public interest benefits
of constructing transmission capacity in lieu of
proposing an Opportunity Cost based rate.
4.

At the option of the Utility requesting the service,
exercised at the time of entering into a contract,
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Opportunity Costa will ba based upon either projected
or experienced operating conditions and wholesale
marketing opportunities.

c.

Regulatory Approvalsi

If the Utility requesting wheeling service agrees in
principle to the appropriateness of including an Opportunity Cost
component in the Firm Wheeling rate, but tha Company and the
Utility requesting service are unable to reach agreement as to
the appropriate level or methodology of such a component, tha
Company shall provide the requested service and unilaterally file
a proposed rate including an Opportunity Cost component with the
FERC, subject to refund.

D.

RreiprrcitYi

A Utility requesting firm wheeling service under this part
may not unreasonably deny the Company comparable service over
comparable facilities controlled by tha requesting Utility.

«.

othtr Rtrtrirtloni

The Company shall not withhold transmission capacity in
order to affect a purchase and resale of bulk power for which
firm transmission is requested.

V.

USE OF FACILITIES CHARGES
To the extent that providing Firm Wheeling services requires

the installation of facilities that are not generally useful to
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tha Company in providing trarsmission sarvicas, tha Company may
requira tha paymant of a usa of facilities charga or contribution
in aid of construction to recover costs associated with the
installation of such facilities.

VI.

ANCILLARY SERVICES
To the extent a request for Firm Wheeling service requires

the provision of generating reserves by the Company, or load
following services, which the Company is able to provide, or if
transmission losses are not otherwise provided, the Company will
attempt to negotiate an appropriate charge for such ancillary
services with the requesting Utility.

If the parties are unable

to agree on an appropriate charge, the services will be provided
and the Company will unilaterally file a proposed charge with the
FERC, subject to refund.

VII. REQUESTS FOR SERVICE AHP TOR IMFQRHATIQH
Requests for Firm wheeling service should be made in writing
to the Company.

The Company will respond to written requests for

wheeling services in writing in a reasonable period of time.

In

cases where the Company is not prepared to provide the requested
service, an explanation of the factors underlying the Company's
decision will be provided.
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The Company will promptly respond to reasonable oral and
written requests by Utilities for information concerning the
price and availability of Firm and Non-Firm wheeling services.
Based on the requesting Utility's representations as to the
nature of the services required, the Company will make a good
faith effort to accurately estimate such price and capacity
information for the use of potential transmission service
customers; however, such estimates do not constitute a binding
commitment as to price or availability of service.

VIII.

PARTICIPATION BY OTHER UTILITIES IN

TRAWSMISSIQW CQNSTRPCTIQtf
A.

With respect to the construction of transmission

facilities of voltage levels of 345 kV or higher and subject to
applicable state regulatory approval, the Company will afford
other Utilities the opportunity to participate in the project,
provided that: (a) the potential participants have a legitimate
interest or service-related purpose in such participation,
(b) the joint participation will not unreasonably delay the
project or render it impractical for the Company as a matter of
economics or engineering, (c) the potential participants are
prepared to equitably share in the costs and benefits of the
project, considering the cost of the project, the value of the
Company's existing investment in related facilities and the
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benefits to be derived by each party, and (d) the Utility
requesting the opportunity to participate has not unreasonably
denied the Company's participation in comparable projects.
B.

With respect to Transmission Dependent Utilities, the

Company will agree to joint participation in upgrades,
improvements or additions to backbone transmission (138 JcV or
higher), interconnections and substation facilities that are
internal to an Integrated Service Area, so that such Utilities
may, subject to applicable state regulatory approval, reasonably
participate in the project, provided that: (a) the potential
participants have a legitimate interest or service-related
purpose in such participation, (b) the joint participation will
not unreasonably delay the project or render it impractical for
the Company as a matter of economics or engineering and (c) the
potential participants are prepared to equitably share in the
costs and benefits of the project considering the cost of the
project, the value of the Company's existing investment in
related facilities and the benefits to be derived by each party.
C.

With respect to Transmission Dependent Utilities, the

Company shall not unreasonably withhold its consent to requests
for upgrades, improvements or additions to interconnections,
transmission and substation facilities located within an
Integrated Service Area, and subject to applicable state
regulatory approval, provided that: (a) the requesting Utility
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arbitar whose decision will ba subjact, vhara raquirad, to review
by tha FERC as an uncontastad offar of sattlament.

D.

statt Jurig<3irti9n«

This Paragraph IX shall not apply to Paragraph VIII to the
extent that a state agency has jurisdiction over complaints
arising from the Company's alleged failure to adhere to the
provisions of Paragraph VIII.

X.

NON-FIRM fflgBLDlS
A.

general«

To the extent it has physical capability to do so, the
Company will provide Non-Firm Wheeling to signatories of the
Western Systems Power Pool Agreement or the Intercompany Pool
Agreement in accordance with the terms of those agreements.

In

addition, the Company will negotiate separate contracts with
Utilities for Non-Firm Wheeling which provide for an equitable
sharing of benefits between the Company and other Utilities
participating in the transactions.

B.

Rattf Baaed on a Three Way Staring Qt Bgntfltt t

The following principles accomplish an equitable sharing of
benefits acceptable to the Company.
1.

The rates for Non-Firm Wheeling service under this

paragraph shall be designed to approximate, to the extant
feasible, an equal three-way sharing of the savings among the
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selling, buying, and wheeling parties, with total savings
calculated based on the difference between the seller's
incremental cost and the buyer's decremental cost*
2.

Each party to this rate shall agree to make available

to the other parties such incremental cost information as is
reasonably necessary to estimate the total savings to be shared.

XI. WHEEUWg TOR OTAMmre FACILITIES
The Company will provide transmission service for Qualifying
Facilities to Utilities in accordance with provisions of 18
C.F.R. {292.303.

XII.

DfTKRATED SKRVICS AREAS
A listing of the Company's existing Integrated Service Areas

is attached hereto.

This list is subject to revision based upon

subsequent changes to the physical capabilities and contractual
limitations under which the Company operates its transmission
system.

Such revisions are subject to the requirements of

Paragraph IX.C, Enforcement.
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INTEGRATED SERVICE AREAS

1.

Tha axlating UP&L aarvica araa in tha Stata of Utah;

2.

Tha axiating UP&L aarvica araa in tha Stata of Idaho;

3.

Tha axiating UP&L aarvica araa in tha Stata of Wyoming;

4.

Tha axiating PP&L aarvica araa in Southam Oragon and
Northarn California;

5.

Tha axiating PPiL Cooa Bay, Oragon aarvica araa;

6.

Tha axiating PP&L Lincoln City, Oragon aarvica araa;

7.

Tha axiating PP&L Willaaatta Vallay, Oragon aarvica
araa;

8.

Tha axiating PP&L Cantral Oragon aarvica araa;

9.

Tha axiating PP&L Hood Rivar, Oragon aarvica araa;

10.

Tha axiating PP&L Portland, Oragon aarvica araa;

11.

Tha axiating PP&L Clataop, Oragon aarvica araa;

12.

Tha axiating PP&L Entarpriaa, Oragon aarvica araa;

13.

Tha axiating PP&L Pandlaton, Oragon aarvica araa;

14.

Tha axiating PP&L Walla Walla, Washington aarvica area;

15.

Tha axiating PP&L Yakima, Waahington aarvica araa

16.

Tha axiating PP&L Sandpoint, Idaho aarvica araa;

17.

Tha axiating PP&L Libby, Montana aarvica araa;

18•

Tha axiating PP&L Kalispall, Montana aarvica area; and

19.

Tha axiating PP&L aarvica araa in tha Stata of Wyoming.
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